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OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
On July 14, 2010, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced former 
Pennsylvania State Senator Vincent J. Fumo to 55 months‟ 
imprisonment, a $411,000 fine, and $2,340,839 in restitution, 
arising from his jury conviction on 137 counts of fraud, tax 
evasion, and obstruction of justice.  A week later, the District 
Court sentenced former Fumo aide Ruth Arnao to 
imprisonment of one year and one day, a $45,000 fine, and 
joint and several restitution with Fumo of up to $792,802, 
arising from her jury conviction on 45 counts of fraud, tax 
evasion, and obstruction of justice.  On appeal, the 
Government argues that the District Court made numerous 
procedural errors in arriving at both sentences.  In particular, 
the Government asserts that the District Court failed to 
announce a final guidelines sentencing range for Fumo.  
Fumo cross-appeals, contending that the District Court erred 
when it denied his motion for a new trial based on alleged 
jury partiality and the District Court‟s admission of evidence 
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related to Pennsylvania‟s public employee ethics law.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm Fumo‟s conviction, vacate 
the sentences of Fumo and Arnao, and remand both for 
resentencing before the District Court.  
 
I. 
A. Background 
Vincent Fumo was a high-profile Pennsylvania state 
senator at the center of one of the largest political scandals in 
recent state history.  Fumo was first elected to the State 
Senate in 1978 from a district in South Philadelphia.
1
  He 
eventually became Chairman of the Senate Democratic 
Appropriations Committee, which put him in control of 
millions of dollars that could be dispensed at his discretion 
for legislative purposes.  Fumo served in the Pennsylvania 
State Senate for thirty years, where it is widely agreed that he 
became one of the most powerful political figures in the state. 
 
 During his three decades as a state senator, Fumo 
frequently directed his publicly paid Senate employees to 
attend to his personal needs and political interests during their 
working hours, as well as at night and on weekends.  Fumo‟s 
Philadelphia district office was staffed by ten such 
                                                 
1 
In 1980, Fumo was convicted of taking part in a scheme to 
place local Democratic party workers on the state legislative 
payroll as “ghost employees.”  Fumo‟s conviction was later 
overturned because of a variance between the indictment and 
the proof offered at trial—a decision that we affirmed on 
appeal.  See United States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
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employees, whose duties included providing constituent 
services to the residents of Fumo‟s district.  However, the 
staffers often also provided Fumo with campaign and 
personal assistance: organizing political fundraisers and 
mailings, processing bills for business accounts, and handling 
various aspects of Fumo‟s personal finances.  Various aides 
also acted as his housekeeper, drove him from place to place, 
managed the refurbishment of his 33-room house, ran 
personal errands, and even drove his daughter to school.  
During Fumo‟s annual trip to Martha‟s Vineyard, 
Massachusetts, his Senate aides would drive two vehicles 
from Philadelphia and back, filled with the luggage of Fumo 
and his guests.  Staffers also used their time to assist a 
Philadelphia City Councilman who was Fumo‟s ally and, for 
two months, to advance the campaign of an ultimately 
unsuccessful Pennsylvania Democratic gubernatorial 
candidate.  Moreover, Fumo misused his Senate staff in 
Harrisburg—several of them renovated and developed a farm 
he had purchased in 2003 as a residential and business 
enterprise.  In exchange, Fumo arranged salaries for his 
employees that were substantially greater than those 
designated by the State Senate for comparable Senate 
employees.  
 
 Fumo also provided non-staffers, such as contractors, 
family members, and girlfriends with access to Senate 
resources, including laptops and computer assistance. Further, 
he used Senate funds to hire contractors for non-legislative 
tasks.  For instance, Fumo obtained a $40,000 state contract 
for a private investigator who, in addition to his legitimate 
activities, conducted surveillance on Fumo‟s former wife, 
girlfriends, ex-girlfriends‟ boyfriends, and at times, political 
rivals.  He obtained an $80,000 state contract for a consultant 
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who spent much of his time assisting Fumo with political 
races and a $45,000 salary for an individual who spent most 
of his time assisting with Fumo‟s farm.  Mitchell Rubin, the 
boyfriend and later husband of Ruth Arnao, was paid $30,000 
per year for five years, without doing much, if any, work at 
all. 
 
 In order to facilitate his use of public funds for his own 
purposes, Fumo falsely represented that employees and 
contractors receiving payment by the Senate were performing 
proper and legitimate legislative functions that they only 
partially or never in fact completed, and failed to disclose the 
private and political services that they were actually 
performing.  Fumo also provided false job descriptions and 
elevated position classifications that conflicted with the duties 
that employees actually carried out.  
 
 In 1991, Fumo and his staff founded a non-profit 
organization that became known as the Citizens Alliance for 
Better Neighborhoods (“Citizens Alliance”).  Arnao, a Senate 
employee on Fumo‟s staff, became its director.  Citizens 
Alliance‟s stated purpose was to improve Philadelphia 
neighborhoods through projects such as removing trash, 
sweeping streets, trimming trees, clearing snow, and cleaning 
alleys and abandoned lots.  Citizens Alliance received much 
of its funding from grants obtained by Fumo from the state 
and other entities.  In 1998, after Fumo brought litigation 
challenging its utility rates, the Philadelphia Electric 
Company (“PECO”) privately agreed to donate $17 million to 
Citizens Alliance as part of a settlement agreement.  The 
existence of the $17 million contribution only became public 
knowledge in November 2003, when it was reported by the 
Philadelphia Inquirer.  After the influx of $17 million, 
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Citizens Alliance expanded the scope of its work, acquiring 
properties for renovation, opening a charter school, and 
attempting to develop an office building for high-tech 
companies.  
  
However, concurrent with its expanded efforts, Fumo 
and Arnao began to use Citizens Alliance funds for their 
personal benefit, including $90,000 for tools and $6,528 for 
vacuum cleaners and floor machines used in Fumo‟s homes.  
Citizens Alliance also provided Fumo and his staff with 
vehicles, including a $38,000 minivan, a $52,000 luxury 
SUV, and a $25,000 jeep.  In total, more than $387,325 went 
towards acquiring and maintaining vehicles for the use of 
Fumo, Arnao, legislative aides, and family members.  Further, 
Citizens Alliance became the landlord of Fumo‟s office on 
Tasker Street in Philadelphia.  While the Senate spent 
$90,000 in rent during a five-year period, Citizens Alliance 
spent over $600,000 to furnish, maintain, and rent Fumo‟s 
office to him at a discount.  The office also served as his 
campaign office and ward headquarters.  Further, Citizens 
Alliance paid for cell phones for many of Fumo‟s staffers, as 
well as his daughter.  It also paid $39,000 for Fumo‟s trip to 
Cuba with five friends and $50,000 for a “war dog” memorial 
in Bucks County.   
 
 Fumo used Citizens Alliance in violation of federal 
501(c)(3) rules for charitable organizations by having it pay 
$250,000 for political polling, $20,000 for a lawsuit against a 
Senate rival, and $68,000 to support opposition to the 
Government‟s construction of dunes along the Jersey shore, 
which would have blocked his seaside house‟s view of the 
ocean and reduced its property value.  In order to oppose the 
dunes, Fumo had his Senate counsel create a nonprofit entity 
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called “Riparian Defense Fund, Inc.” to funnel funds from 
Citizens Alliance, and then misled the IRS and Pennsylvania 
Secretary of State as to the nature and purpose of the 
organization.  Further, Fumo misrepresented political and 
campaign expenses as “community development consulting” 
expenses on Citizens Alliance‟s tax filings, deceiving the IRS 
yet again.   
 
Just as he had done with his public employees, Fumo 
directed Citizens Alliance staff to assist with his personal 
matters, traveling to his house on the Jersey shore to repair 
and paint his dock and deck, picking up trash, and 
undertaking other errands and tasks. They also frequently 
cleaned and served his Philadelphia home, and delivered 
equipment and personal items to his farm.  Additionally, 
Citizens Alliance paid for a $27,000 bulldozer, a lawn tractor, 
a dump truck, an all-terrain vehicle, and a Ford F-150 pickup 
truck for his Harrisburg-area farm.  Fumo and Arnao never 
disclosed the funds used for Fumo‟s personal benefit to 
Citizens Alliance‟s accountants, and when asked about those 
funds by an accountant, Arnao misstated their purpose.  Fumo 
and Arnao also made repeated misrepresentations to 
journalists about Citizens Alliance and how it spent its funds.   
 
Fumo served on the board of directors of the 
Independence Seaport Museum (“ISM”).  Board members did 
not receive compensation or benefits from the museum, but 
were expected to help the museum develop and solicit donors.  
While Fumo did not donate or solicit much in the way of 
donations for the ISM, he did use his influence to obtain 
grants for the museum from the state and other entities.  
However, at the expense of the ISM, he also repeatedly used 
its yachts for pleasure cruises and its ship models for 
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decorations in his home and office.  These personal uses of 
the ISM‟s resources, which were approved by ISM‟s 
president John Carter, were in violation of the museum‟s 
policies and bylaws.  Fumo later claimed that he used the 
yachts to help raise money for the museum and that he 
sometimes paid for their use. 
 
  In 2003, the Government began investigating Fumo.  
In December, the Philadelphia Inquirer published a series of 
articles about Citizens Alliance‟s use of funds and its 
relationship with Fumo.  Shortly thereafter, Fumo directed a 
computer technician on his staff to ensure that all emails to 
and from Fumo and others were deleted.  When the Inquirer 
ran an article entitled “FBI Probes Fumo Deal” on January 
25, 2004, Fumo involved additional Senate aides and 
expanded the scope of his attempts to delete emails. 
Throughout 2004 his aides, including Arnao, deleted email 
from numerous computers and communication devices, and 
then “wiped” the computers using sophisticated programs in 
order to prevent forensic analysis.  These efforts included 
wiping computers at Arnao‟s home and at Citizens Alliance.  
Despite Fumo‟s efforts, two of the aides involved in the 
deletion kept emails between each other, including emails 
regarding Fumo‟s instructions to eliminate computer evidence 
of the fraud.  
 
B.  The Trial
 The Government charged Fumo and Arnao under what 
was to later become a 141 count superseding indictment.  
Counts 1 through 64 related to fraud on the Pennsylvania 
State Senate, Counts 65 through 98 to fraud on Citizens 
Alliance, Counts 99 through 103 to tax evasion by Citizens 
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Alliance, Counts 104 through 108 to fraud on ISM, and 
Counts 109 through 141 to obstruction of justice and 
conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice.  Fumo was 
charged in 139 counts, including all but Counts 100 and 102.  
At trial, the Government voluntarily moved to dismiss Counts 
36 and 38 against Fumo.  Arnao was charged in 45 counts, 
including Counts 65 through 98, related to the fraud on 
Citizens Alliance, Counts 99, 100, and 102, related to tax 
evasion, and Counts 109, 121, 124, 126, 127, 129, 132, and 
134, related to obstruction of justice.  
 
 The case was originally assigned to the Honorable 
William H. Yohn, Jr., and after some delay while Fumo found 
satisfactory defense counsel, jury selection began on 
September 8, 2008.  After the case was reassigned to the 
Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter, jury selection resumed on 
October 20, 2008.  The trial lasted an additional five months, 
with the proceedings halted on Fridays.  By the time it rested 
its case on January 26, 2009, the Government had called 80 
witnesses in its case-in-chief.  The defendants then called an 
additional 25 witnesses, including Fumo himself, and rested 
their case on February 18, 2009.  On March 16, 2009, after 
four days of deliberation, the jury convicted Fumo of all 137 
counts presented against him, and Arnao of all 45 counts 
presented against her. 
 
A number of events occurred during the trial that 
Fumo now asserts as the bases for his cross-appeal.  First, 
during the trial, the Government called John J. Contino as an 
expert witness to testify about the Pennsylvania Public 
Official and Employee Ethics Act, 65 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 
1101, et seq. (the “Ethics Act”).  Contino is the Executive 
Director of the State Ethics Commission (the “Commission”), 
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the body charged with enforcing the Ethics Act.  Section 
1103(a) of The Ethics Act prohibits a public official or 
employee from engaging in conduct that constitutes a 
“conflict of interest,” which is defined at § 1102 as the “[u]se 
by a public official or public employee of the authority of his 
office or employment . . . for the private pecuniary benefit of 
himself, a member of his immediate family or a business with 
which he or a member of his immediate family is associated.”   
 
Prior to the trial, Judge Yohn had found Contino to be 
“well qualified” as an expert and ruled that it was 
“appropriate for him to talk about the Ethics Act.”  (J.A. 431).  
During trial, Contino testified as to how and to whom the 
Ethics Act applied, whether it was mandatory in nature, and 
as to how the legislature was apprised of the Ethics Act and 
the Commission‟s interpretation of it.  Contino also 
referenced abridged versions of the Commission‟s opinions, 
summarizing violations that were considered and ruled upon 
by the Commission.  He did not, however, express an opinion 
as to whether Fumo‟s own actions violated the Ethics Act or 
whether Fumo was guilty of the federal charges against him.   
 
The Government also extensively cross-examined 
Fumo on the subject of the Ethics Act and specifically his 
knowledge and understanding of it.  At the time of the cross-
examination, the District Court provided a limiting instruction 
to the jury, reminding them that no law required Fumo to 
study the decisions or reports of the Commission.  
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court further 
instructed the jury on the Ethics Act, telling them that they 
could “consider [such] evidence . . . to the extent that [they] 
find it sheds light on questions of willfulness, intent to 
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defraud, and good faith” but that “violation of the ethics laws 
should not be considered by [them] as implying a violation of 
federal criminal law” and that they “may not convict Fumo of 
any of the counts alleging that he conspired or attempted to 
execute a scheme to defraud the Senate of money or property 
simply on the basis of the conclusion that he may have 
violated a state ethics law.”  (J.A. 4363). 
 
On March 15, 2009, while jury deliberations were 
ongoing, a local television station reported that one of the 
jurors, hereinafter referred to as “Juror 1,” had made postings 
on both his Facebook and Twitter pages related to the trial.  
That night, which was the night before the jury returned its 
verdict, Juror 1 was watching television when he learned that 
the media was following the comments he had made on the 
internet.  He subsequently panicked and deleted the 
comments from his Facebook page.   
 
Prior to deleting them, Juror 1 made the following 
comments on his Facebook “wall” during jury selection and 
the trial: 
 
-- Sept. 18: (apparently upon a continuance of 
the trial due to judge‟s illness): “[Juror 1] is 
glad he got a 5 week reprieve, but still could use 
the money . . .” 
 
-- Jan. 11: (apparently referring to the end of 
the government‟s case): “[Juror 1] is wondering 
if this could be the week to end Part 1?” 
 
-- Jan. 21: “[Juror 1] wonders if today will 
really be the end of Part 1???” 
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-- Mar. 4: (conclusion of closing 
arguments): “[Juror 1] can‟t believe tomorrow 
may actually be the end!!!”2 
 
-- Mar. 8: (Sunday evening before second 
day of deliberations): “[Juror 1] is not sure 
about tomorrow . . .”3 
 
-- Mar. 9: (end of second day of 
deliberations): “[Juror 1] says today was 
much better than expected and tomorrow looks 
promising too!” 
 
-- Mar. 13: (Friday after completion of first 
week of deliberations): “Stay tuned for the big 
announcement on Monday everyone!” 
 
(J.A. 587-88). 
 
 Juror 1‟s Facebook comments appeared over the many 
months of the trial, and in the midst of dozens of other 
comments he made unrelated to the trial.  It was the final, 
March 13 post that was the subject of media attention.  With 
                                                 
2 
A friend responded to the March 4 Facebook post by asking 
“of what?”  Juror 1 responded: “Can‟t say till tomorrow! 
LOL.” (J.A. 592 n.30). 
3
 A friend responded to the March 8 Facebook post by asking 
“Why?”  Juror 1 responded: “think of the last 5 months dear.” 
(J.A. 592). 
 
 
 14 
 
regard to Twitter, Juror 1 made a single comment or “tweet” 
on March 13, stating “This is it . . . no looking back now!”  
(J.A. 587). 
 
 When Fumo learned of Juror 1‟s Facebook and Twitter 
comments, he moved to disqualify Juror 1 from the jury.  The 
District Court held an in camera review of the issue, and 
questioned Juror 1 about his activities on these two websites 
and his general media consumption.  Juror 1 told the judge 
that he saw the news report that night because he had been 
watching another show when the local news began.  He 
nevertheless explained that he had avoided television news 
during the entire trial.  He also affirmed that he had not 
discussed the substance of the case with anyone.  Juror 1 
further stated that he had made the comments “for my benefit 
to just get it out of my head, similar to a blog posting or 
somebody journaling something.”  (J.A. 589). 
 
In a written opinion, the District Court determined that 
there was no evidence that Juror 1 received outside influence 
due to his Facebook or Twitter postings and concluded that, 
although in violation of his instruction not to discuss the case 
outside of the jury room, they were “nothing more than 
harmless ramblings having no prejudicial effect.  They were 
so vague as to be virtually meaningless.”  (J.A. 592).  
 
More than three months after the verdict, but before 
sentencing, Fumo filed a second motion for a new trial, 
attaching the affidavit of counsel Dennis Cogan.  The 
affidavit asserted that journalist Ralph Cipriano, writing for 
Philadelphia Magazine, had contacted Cogan regarding 
information he obtained during post-verdict interviews with 
several jurors.  According to an article written by Cipriano, 
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on the morning of March 16, the day of the verdict, all of the 
jurors had heard media reports about Juror 1‟s use of 
Facebook and Twitter.  Further, another juror hereinafter 
referred to as “Juror 2,” indicated that while at her workplace 
on a Friday, several co-workers informed her of Fumo‟s prior 
overturned conviction, as well as the conviction and 
imprisonment of John Carter, former president of the ISM.  
Both of these facts had previously been excluded from the 
trial by the District Court.  Specifically, the article stated that 
Juror 2 had told Cipriano that: 
 
 Co-workers stopped by and talked about 
things in the media, such as Fumo‟s prior 1980 
conviction, subsequently overturned by a judge, 
for hiring ghost employees. Judge Buckwalter 
repeatedly turned down prosecution requests to 
tell the jury about that prior conviction.  But 
[Juror 2] found out anyway, even though she 
held up her hands and told co-workers: Please 
don’t talk to me, I can’t discuss the case.  Co-
workers also told her that John Carter, former 
president of the Independence Seaport Museum, 
and the guy who gave Fumo permission to take 
free yacht trips, was doing time for fraud. The 
judge didn‟t want the jury to know about Carter, 
either. 
 
(J.A. 703-04) (emphasis in original).  There was no evidence 
that any other juror had learned of Fumo‟s prior conviction or 
the conviction of Carter, and the other five jurors interviewed 
by Cipriano did not mention either fact.   
 
 The District Court denied the motion, concluding that 
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the information was an insufficient basis to hold a hearing 
and that, even if everything asserted by Juror 2 were true, it 
would not constitute the showing of substantial prejudice 
required to grant a new trial. 
 
C. Sentencing 
 On July 8, the District Court held a sentencing hearing 
at which the parties made arguments directed at the 
sentencing guidelines calculations for both Fumo and Arnao.  
The Government adopted the position of the Pre-sentence 
Report (“PSR”), which divided Fumo‟s crimes into two 
groups pursuant to § 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines—
the first made up of the 134 fraud and obstruction of justice 
counts, and the second consisting of the three tax evasion 
counts (Counts 99, 101, and 103).   
 
 As to the first group, the PSR began with a base 
offense level of 7 under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1).  It then 
added 18 levels under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) because it calculated 
the loss from the fraud to be greater than $2,500,000, and 
specifically $4,339,041.  The PSR then added 2 levels under § 
2B1.1(b)(8)(A) because it concluded Fumo misrepresented 
that he was acting on behalf of a charitable organization, 
Citizens Alliance.  Similarly, it added 2 levels under § 
2B1.1(b)(9)(C) because the fraud involved the use of 
sophisticated means, in that Fumo used a shell corporation, 
Eastern Leasing Corp., to purchase vehicles for his personal 
use and conduct political polling, and used a consulting firm 
as a conduit to conceal his role in a lawsuit against one of his 
political rivals.  The PSR added an additional 4 levels under § 
3B1.1(a) for Fumo‟s role as the organizer or leader of the 
fraud, and 2 levels under § 3B1.3 because he was in a 
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position of public trust.  Finally, under § 3C1.1, it added 2 
levels for Fumo‟s obstruction of justice during the 
investigation of the offense, and 2 levels for his obstruction of 
justice in perjuring himself at trial.  In total, the PSR 
calculated Fumo‟s adjusted offense level for the fraud group 
as 39. 
 
 As to the tax evasion group, the PSR began with a base 
offense level of 24 under §§ 2T1.1(a)(1) and 2T4.1(J) because 
the tax loss was more than $2,500,000, and specifically 
$4,624,300.  It then added 2 levels under § 2T1.1(b)(2) 
because the offense involved sophisticated means, for a total 
adjusted offense level of 26.   
 
 Because the tax evasion group‟s offense level of 26 
was more than 8 levels below the fraud group‟s offense level 
of 39, pursuant to § 3D1.4(c), no additional levels were added 
to the larger of the two.  Accordingly, the PSR calculated, and 
the Government argued, that the District Court should find 
Fumo‟s total adjusted offense level to be 39 and his criminal 
history category to be I, which would mean a guideline range 
of 262 to 327 months‟ imprisonment.   
 
 The day after the July 8 hearing, the District Court 
issued an order ruling that it would not apply the 2-level 
enhancement for charitable misrepresentation, the 2-level 
enhancement for sophisticated means, or the second 2-level 
obstruction of justice enhancement for perjury at trial.  It also 
calculated the total loss from the fraud to be $2,379,914—
about $2,000,000 less than the Government‟s calculation and 
a reduction of 2 additional levels.  The District Court also 
declined to apply the 2-level enhancement for sophisticated 
means to the tax evasion group.  Additionally, Fumo 
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requested two downward departures based on his physical 
health under § 5H1.4 and for extraordinary public service 
under § 5H1.11.  The District Court denied the former and 
reserved judgment on the latter until the final sentencing 
hearing.  With reduced adjusted offense levels of 31 and 24 
for the fraud and tax evasion groups, respectively, the 
combined offense level became 32 under § 3D1.4(b), 
translating into a guideline range of 121 to 151 months‟ 
imprisonment.  
 
 On July 14, the District Court held another lengthy 
hearing.  When the Government learned that the Court had 
calculated a guideline range of 121 to 151 months, it sought 
an upward variance, arguing that the adjusted range did not 
adequately represent or take into account the full loss from 
the fraud, the damage to public institutions, Fumo‟s alleged 
perjury at trial, other obstructive conduct, and Fumo‟s alleged 
lack of remorse.  The District Court declined to vary upwards.  
It also denied Fumo‟s request for a departure on the basis of 
his medical condition.  Then, after hearing from six witnesses 
who spoke on Fumo‟s behalf, and reviewing hundreds of 
letters from the public, it found that Fumo had “worked hard 
for the public and . . . worked extraordinarily hard” such that 
it would “grant a departure from the guidelines.”  (J.A. 1622-
23).  Without enunciating any modification to the guideline 
range of 121 to 151 months, the District Court then sentenced 
Fumo to a term of imprisonment of 55 months, three years of 
supervised release, a $411,000 fine, a $13,700 special 
assessment, $2,084,979 in restitution, and $255,860 in 
prejudgment interest on the restitution.  
 
 Fumo filed a Motion for Correction of Sentence under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), asking the Court to 
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resolve various issues related to the sentence.  Among the 
issues raised was the fact that the District Court had, during 
the July 14 sentencing hearing, three times referred to the 
sentence as a “departure” from the guidelines range.  The 
motion papers noted that “[w]hen a sentencing court grants a 
true „departure,‟ [as opposed to a variance,] it must „state how 
the departure affects the Guidelines calculation.‟  This Court[] 
fail[ed] to make such a statement . . . .”  (J.A. 1629) (quoting 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc)).  They also suggested that “[i]n context, it appears that 
the Court intended the sentence as a statute-based „variance,‟ 
designed to achieve a punishment sufficient but not greater 
than necessary to fulfill the objectives set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(2), rather than as a Guidelines Manual-based 
„departure.‟”  (J.A. 1629).  Fumo asked that the Court 
“correct this technical error.”  (J.A. 1629).  The Government 
filed a response, contesting Fumo‟s characterization of the 
Court‟s below-guideline sentence as a variance and noting 
that “the Court repeatedly stated that it decided to grant the 
departure motion based on public service.”  (J.A. 1635). 
 
 The following day, the District Court issued a 
Memorandum and Order, which among other things, 
explained that “[t]he government correctly states that the 
court announced it was granting a departure.  Thereafter, the 
court never enunciated the guideline level to which it 
departed, and, in fact, never reached the sentence it did by 
consulting any specific level on the guideline chart.”  (J.A. 
1653).  The District Court also filed a Judgment and a formal 
Statement of Reasons. The Statement read, in pertinent part: 
 
  I next determined whether there should 
be a departure from the guidelines and 
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announced at the sentencing hearing that there 
should be based on my finding extraordinary 
good works by the defendant.  I did not 
announce what specific guideline level the 
offense fell into; that is to say, the precise 
number of levels by which I intended to depart 
because until I considered all other sentencing 
factors, I could not determine in precise months 
the extent that I would vary from the guidelines. 
 
 Having advised counsel of the offense 
level that I found and my intent to depart 
downward, I then proceeded to hear from 
counsel their respective analyses of what an 
appropriate sentence should be.  
 
 The procedure I followed was perhaps 
more akin to that associated with a variance 
than a downward departure because I never 
announced nor have I ever determined to what 
guideline level I had departed. Ultimately, the 
argument over which it was elevates form over 
substance. 
 
(Sealed App. 185-86).  The Statement of Reasons further 
indicated that the Court had granted Fumo a departure under 
§ 5H1.11 of the Sentencing Guidelines for “Military Record, 
Charitable Service, Good Works.”  
 
 After sentencing Fumo, the District Court held a 
sentencing hearing for Arnao.  The PSR originally 
recommended, and the Government argued, that the loss from 
Arnao‟s fraud was between $1 and $2.5 million, leading to an 
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offense level of 23 under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  The PSR also recommended 2-level 
enhancements for the use of sophisticated means, 
misrepresentation on behalf of a charitable organization, and 
obstructions of justice, generating a total adjusted offense 
level of 29.  Just as for Fumo, the PSR‟s offense level 
calculation for the tax evasion group began with a base 
offense level of 24 and then added 2 levels because the 
offense involved sophisticated means, for a total adjusted 
offense level of 26.  Under the grouping rules of § 3D1.4, two 
additional levels were added to the higher offense level of 29, 
making the combined offense level 31.  With a criminal 
history category of I, this entailed a sentencing range of 108 
to 135 months. 
 
 At the hearing, the District Court rejected the 
sophisticated means enhancement and determined that the 
loss from the Citizens Alliance fraud was less than 
$1,000,000, and specifically $958,080, thus reducing the 
fraud and tax evasion group offense levels to 25 and 24, 
respectively.  This created a combined total offense level of 
27 under the grouping rules of § 3D1.4 and a guidelines 
sentencing range of 70 to 87 months.  The District Court then 
imposed a sentence of one year and one day—a substantial 
downward variance—to run concurrently on all counts, three 
years‟ supervised release, a $45,000 fine, a $4,500 special 
assessment, and restitution to Citizens Alliance in the amount 
of $792,802, jointly and severally with Fumo.  
 
II.
4
 
                                                 
4 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter under 18 
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Appeal of Fumo’s conviction 
A. Evidence relating to the Pennsylvania Ethics Act 
In his appeal of the conviction, Fumo argues that the 
evidence presented by the Government with regard to the 
state Ethics Act was irrelevant to the federal criminal charges 
against him, and was highly prejudicial because it was likely 
to confuse the jury and suggest that Fumo was in violation of 
state law.  The District Court‟s rulings regarding the 
admissibility of evidence and expert testimony are reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 
321, 335 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 
758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
 The Government responds that evidence regarding the 
Ethics Act was of substantial relevance because it was 
necessary to show that the Senate did not approve of the kind 
of expenditures Fumo made using state money, as well as to 
show that Fumo intended to deceive the Senate by misleading 
it about how he was spending that money.  The Government 
notes that this was particularly true given Fumo‟s initial 
theory of the case at trial—that no rules or laws barred 
employing Senate resources for his personal use, or that if 
there were such rules, that they were entirely vague, unclear, 
and unenforced.  Fumo also initially planned to call three 
experts regarding their experiences with the “customs and 
practices of the Senate,” focusing specific attention on 
“accepted uses of staff and other resources as they comport 
with the Ethics Act.”  (Gov. Supp. App. 64).  
                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 3221, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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 In light of Fumo‟s theory of the case, the content and 
enforcement of the Ethics Act was clearly relevant to the 
Government‟s claim that there were rules that Fumo broke 
repeatedly, that those rules were clear enough for him to 
understand, and to show that he was deceiving the Senate 
when he misrepresented or omitted aspects of his actions and 
expenditures to avoid the perception that he had violated 
those rules.  Without this evidence, it would have been very 
difficult for the Government to prove fraudulent intent.  See 
United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“Proving specific intent in mail fraud cases is difficult, and, 
as a result, a liberal policy has developed to allow the 
government to introduce evidence that even peripherally 
bears on the question of intent.”).  Further, the District Court 
read the jury a jointly drafted instruction, both during the trial 
and after the closings, which emphasized that Fumo was not 
on trial for violating the Ethics Act, and that even a violation 
of the Ethics Act by itself did not imply that he defrauded or 
conspired to defraud the Senate. The District Court‟s finding 
that evidence related to the Ethics Act was relevant and not 
unfairly prejudicial was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
 Similarly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
District Court to permit John Contino, the Director of the 
State Ethics Commission, to testify about the Ethics Act.  We 
have previously explained that “[w]hile it is not permissible 
for a witness to testify as to the governing law since it is the 
district court‟s duty to explain the law to the jury, our Court 
has allowed expert testimony concerning business customs 
and practices.”  United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 196 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  These customs and practices will sometimes 
include applicable legal regulations, such as registration 
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requirements for securities registration under the Securities 
Acts, Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 218-
19 (3d Cir. 2006), or Medicaid rules, United States v. Davis, 
471 F.3d 783, 789 (7th Cir. 2006).  Similarly, expert 
testimony may also concern ethics rules and laws related to 
public officials and government contractors.   
 
 Appropriately, Contino never testified as to whether 
Fumo himself had violated the Ethics Act, or whether he was 
guilty of any of the crimes with which he was charged.  
Contino also properly explained the Commission‟s 
disciplinary proceedings, its advisory opinions, and the 
annual report it publishes, which is distributed to every state 
legislator.  This was evidence relevant to the question of 
whether Fumo was aware of the Senate ethics rules, and thus 
had an intent to defraud when he represented and omitted 
facts in a way that made him falsely appear to be in 
compliance with those rules.  Part of Contino‟s explanation of 
the seriousness and mandatory nature of the rules was a 
description of some of the Commission‟s disciplinary 
opinions, and the penalties that were imposed for violations 
of the rules.  The Government also properly posed questions 
to Contino about whether certain hypothetical facts would 
constitute violations of the Ethics Act—a line of questioning 
it had suggested in its pretrial disclosures and later pursued in 
light of Fumo‟s theory of the case. 
 
Finally, the Government‟s cross-examination of Fumo 
on the subject of the Ethics Act was also appropriate.  During 
direct examination, Fumo testified that “there are no rules[,]” 
as to his exercise of discretion regarding spending and that 
“there are no guidelines” as to whether staffers can do 
personal errands for lawmakers.  (J.A. 3967).  He then 
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claimed that “none of this is written down anywhere, and I 
think it‟s left up to the discretion of the senator to do that as 
you see fit and appropriate and as you need it.”  (J.A. 3967).  
Accordingly, in order to impeach this testimony, the 
Government understandably questioned Fumo about his 
familiarity with the annual reports of the Commission that 
were sent to him personally.  Fumo denied ever having read 
the annual reports of the Commission, although he admitted 
being aware of them.  Yet merely because this line of 
questioning did not turn out to be directly fruitful for the 
Government—although it very well may have undermined 
Fumo‟s credibility—does not mean that it was irrelevant or 
unfairly prejudicial.  As a precaution, however, the District 
Court instructed the jury that Fumo was, among other things, 
not required to have read the annual reports. 
 
 In sum, the District Court was well within the bounds 
of its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Contino 
and permitting the cross-examination of Fumo on the issue of 
the Ethics Act. 
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B.  Challenges to the jury’s fairness and impartiality 
 Fumo challenges two rulings of the District Court 
denying his motions for a new trial on account of jurors‟ 
exposure to extraneous information, and the purported 
prejudice and partiality that may have resulted.  We review a 
court‟s order “which denies a new trial based on alleged 
prejudicial information for abuse of discretion.”  United 
States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 777 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted).  “A new trial is warranted if 
the defendant likely suffered „substantial prejudice‟ as a result 
of the jury‟s exposure to the extraneous information.”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 
2001)).  “In examining for prejudice, we must conduct an 
objective analysis by considering the probable effect of the 
allegedly prejudicial information on a hypothetical average 
juror.”  Id. (quoting Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 238 (internal quotation 
omitted)).  Yet, the “court may inquire only into the existence 
of extraneous information” and not “into the subjective effect 
of such information on the particular jurors.”  Wilson v. 
Vermont Castings Inc., 170 F.3d 391, 394 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 
 “If there is reason to believe that jurors have been 
exposed to prejudicial information, the trial judge is obliged 
to investigate the effect of that exposure on the outcome of 
the trial.”  United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 669 (3d Cir. 
1993) (internal quotation omitted).  However, the court is not 
required to conduct an investigation where an insufficient 
factual basis for it exists.  Id.  Further, even if a foundation 
has been established for the claim, the court need not hold a 
hearing “at the behest of a party whose allegations if 
established would not entitle it to relief.”  United States v. 
Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1991).  Accordingly, if the 
Court declines to hold a hearing, it must assume that the party 
seeking the hearing is able to prove that the jury was 
presented with extraneous information, id., and determine 
whether “the defendant likely suffered „substantial prejudice‟ 
as a result of the jury‟s exposure.”  Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 238 
(internal citation omitted).   
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1.  Juror 1’s comments on Facebook and Twitter  
Fumo argues that Juror 1‟s comments on Facebook 
and Twitter brought widespread public attention to the jury‟s 
deliberations, creating a “cloud of intense and widespread 
media coverage . . . and [the] public expectation that a verdict 
[wa]s imminent[,]” thereby violating his Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair and impartial trial.  (Cross-App‟t Br. 131).  
Fumo also argues that the fact that Juror 1 watched the 
evening news, in which his own internet comments were 
discussed, implies or suggests that he may have been 
compromised by bias or partiality. 
 
In 2009, the Judicial Conference Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management published proposed 
model jury instructions regarding “The Use of Electronic 
Technology to Conduct Research on or Communicate about a 
Case.”  While the instructions focus on the importance of 
jurors not consulting websites or blogs to research or obtain 
information about the case, they also caution and instruct 
jurors on the use of social media: 
 
Before Trial: 
 
. . . . 
 
Until you retire to deliberate, you may 
not discuss this case with anyone, even your 
fellow jurors.  After you retire to deliberate, you 
may begin discussing the case with your fellow 
jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with 
anyone else until you have returned a verdict 
and the case is at an end.  I hope that for all of 
you this case is interesting and noteworthy.  I 
know that many of you use cell phones, 
Blackberries, the internet and other tools of 
technology.  You also must not talk to anyone 
about this case or use these tools to 
communicate electronically with anyone about 
the case. This includes your family and friends. 
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You may not communicate with anyone about 
the case on your cell phone, through e-mail, 
Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on 
Twitter, through any blog or website, through 
any internet chat room, or by way of any other 
social networking websites, including 
Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, and YouTube. 
 
At the Close of the Case: 
 
During your deliberations, you must not 
communicate with or provide any information 
to anyone by any means about this case. You 
may not use any electronic device or media, 
such as a telephone, cell phone, smart phone, 
iPhone, Blackberry or computer; the internet, 
any internet service, or any text or instant 
messaging service; or any internet chat room, 
blog, or website such as Facebook, My Space, 
LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate 
to anyone any information about this case or to 
conduct any research about this case until I 
accept your verdict.  
 
Proposed Model Jury Instructions: The Use of Electronic 
Technology to Conduct Research on or Communicate about a 
Case, Judicial Conference Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management, December 2009, 
available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DIR10-
018-Attachment.pdf (last visited August 22, 2011). 
 
We enthusiastically endorse these instructions and 
strongly encourage district courts to routinely incorporate 
them or similar language into their own instructions.  Not 
unlike a juror who speaks with friends or family members 
about a trial before the verdict is returned, a juror who 
comments about a case on the internet or social media may 
engender responses that include extraneous information about 
the case, or attempts to exercise persuasion and influence.  If 
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anything, the risk of such prejudicial communication may be 
greater when a juror comments on a blog or social media 
website than when she has a discussion about the case in 
person, given that the universe of individuals who are able to 
see and respond to a comment on Facebook or a blog is 
significantly larger.  
 
Yet while prohibiting and admonishing jurors from 
commenting—even obliquely—about a trial on social 
networking websites and other internet mediums is the 
preferred and highly recommended practice, it does not 
follow that every failure of a juror to abide by that prohibition 
will result in a new trial.  Rather, as with other claims of juror 
partiality and exposure to extraneous information, courts must 
look to determine if the defendant was substantially 
prejudiced.  
 
Here, with regard to Juror 1‟s posts, none of Fumo‟s 
theories of bias or partiality is plausible, let alone sufficient 
for us to find that the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a new trial.
5
  The District Court 
questioned Juror 1 in camera at length about both his 
comments online and his efforts to avoid media coverage of 
the case.  The Court found no evidence that Juror 1 had been 
contacted regarding the posts, or that Juror 1 had been 
accessing media sources beyond the single incident when he 
accidently learned of the attention that the media and public 
were paying to his comments.  The Court also concluded that 
                                                 
5 
Fumo also highlights the extensive media coverage that was 
focused on Fumo‟s trial in the Philadelphia media market.  He 
suggests that the District Court did not adequately recognize 
or address this media attention, and too infrequently 
instructed the jury to avoid media coverage of the case.  Yet 
Fumo concedes that the District Court gave such instructions 
on six different occasions throughout the trial, including at 
the beginning of voir dire on September 8, 2008.  The District 
Court was well within its discretion in how it chose to instruct 
the jury about media exposure.  
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the posts on Facebook were “so opaque that there was no 
possible way that members of [Facebook‟s] Philadelphia 
network could read them and have any obvious understanding 
of his discussion.”  (J.A. 591).  It then described the posts as 
“nothing more than harmless ramblings having no prejudicial 
effect.  They were so vague as to be virtually meaningless.  
[Juror 1] raised no specific facts dealing with the trial, and 
nothing in these comments indicated any disposition toward 
anyone involved in the suit.”  (J.A. 592).  We largely agree 
with these characterizations of the comments.  Finally, the 
District Court found that despite violating its prohibition 
against discussing the details of the trial, “[Juror 1] was a 
trustworthy juror who was very conscientious of his duties.  
There was no evidence presented by either party showing that 
his extra-jury misconduct had a prejudicial impact on the 
Defendants.”  (J.A. 597-98). 
 
 In light of these findings, which were based in large 
part on Juror 1‟s in-person testimony and demeanor, there is 
simply no plausible theory for how Fumo suffered any 
prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice, from Juror 1‟s 
Facebook and Twitter comments. 
 
Nor does Fumo provide a 
plausible theory for how the fact that other jurors may have 
learned of Juror 1‟s “vague” and “virtually meaningless” 
comments on Facebook could have led to substantial 
prejudice against him.  Accordingly, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied Fumo‟s motion for a new 
trial on this basis. 
 
2.  Juror 2’s exposure to excluded evidence 
 Three months after his conviction, Fumo‟s counsel 
alleged that Juror 2 had learned from co-workers, during the 
trial, about both Fumo‟s prior overturned conviction for 
hiring ghost employees, as well as the conviction of the 
former ISM president, John Carter, on charges of fraud.  Both 
of these pieces of evidence had been excluded from the trial 
by the District Court.  In contrast to allegations of bias made 
during a trial, we “are always reluctant to haul jurors in after 
they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential 
 31 
 
instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.  As 
we have said before, post-verdict inquiries may lead to evil 
consequences: subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting 
juryroom deliberation, burdening courts with meritless 
applications, increasing temptation for jury tampering and 
creating uncertainty in jury verdicts.”  Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 
97 (quoting United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d 
Cir. 1989)).  “It is qualitatively a different thing to conduct a 
voir dire during an ongoing proceeding at which the jury is 
part of the adjudicative process than to recall a jury months or 
years later for that purpose.”  Id. at 98. 
 
Here, the District Court rejected the foundational basis 
of the allegations that Juror 2 had learned of excluded 
evidence from co-workers.  It characterized defense counsel‟s 
double-hearsay affidavit, which recounted the reporter‟s 
interviews with the jurors, as lacking the “clear, strong, 
substantial, and incontrovertible evidence that a specific, 
nonspeculative impropriety occurred.”  (J.A. 692).  We need 
not address the question of whether there was sufficient 
foundational basis for a hearing, however, because we agree 
with the District Court that even if everything reported by 
Cipriano about what Juror 2 learned from her co-workers 
were true, it would not be sufficient for a showing of 
“substantial prejudice.”  We also need not determine which 
party has the burden of persuasion in deciding this issue, as 
even if the burden were on the Government to show the lack 
of substantial prejudice, we find that it pointed to sufficient 
evidence in the record for the District Court to conclude that 
it made such a showing.  
 
The factors we have looked to in determining whether 
there was substantial prejudice include whether (1) “the 
extraneous information . . . relate[s] to one of the elements of 
the case that was decided against the party moving for a new 
trial,” Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 239; (2) “the extent of the jury‟s 
exposure to the extraneous information; [(3)] the time at 
which the jury receives the extraneous information; [(4)] the 
length of the jury‟s deliberations and the structure of the 
verdict; [(5)] the existence of instructions from the court that 
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the jury should consider only evidence developed in the 
case[,]”  Urban, 404 F.3d at 778 (quoting Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 
240-41); and (6) whether there is “a heavy volume of 
incriminating evidence[.]”  Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 241 (internal 
quotation omitted).   
 
Here, while the fourth and to some extent the first 
factor weigh in Fumo‟s favor, they are easily overwhelmed 
by the second, fifth, and sixth factors, which weigh heavily 
against a finding of substantial prejudice.  First, while 
knowledge of Fumo‟s earlier conviction had some potential 
for prejudice, the fact that the conviction occurred nearly 
thirty years prior, in 1980, as well as the fact that it was 
overturned, are mitigating factors.  Perhaps most importantly, 
the fact that only one juror was exposed to a brief verbal 
summary of the excluded evidence from her coworkers is a 
compelling consideration against a finding of prejudice.  See 
Urban, 404 F.3d at 778 (finding that the extent of the jury‟s 
exposure to a news article “was limited to non-existent, thus 
supporting the absence of prejudice” where only one juror 
had read the prejudicial article, and four others had “looked at 
the picture on the first page . . . or glanced at [its] contents”).  
Moreover, the District Court gave careful and repeated 
instructions to the jurors, including immediately before 
deliberation, that they should “not let rumors, suspicions, or 
anything else that [they] may have seen or heard outside of 
the court influence [their] decision in any way.”  (J.A. 4631).  
Curative instructions cannot fix every mistake, but we do 
generally presume that juries follow their instructions.  United 
States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 2010).  Finally, 
the sixth factor—the heavy volume of incriminating 
evidence—also weighs heavily against a finding of prejudice.  
The Government‟s case was presented over the course of 
three months and included an astonishing 80 witnesses.  
Further, as the Government accurately explains in footnote 16 
of its opening brief, “Fumo testified at trial [and] admitted 
many of the acts alleged in the indictment, but asserted they 
were not criminal . . . .”  (Appellant Br. 44 n.16).  While 
many of the physical facts related to the fraud were therefore 
largely undisputed, the active destruction of computer records 
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related to the fraud provided particularly potent evidence of 
Fumo‟s motive, knowledge and intent.  
 
In light of these factors, and even assuming that the 
Government had the burden of persuasion, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion when it found that Juror 2‟s 
exposure to extraneous information was unlikely to have led 
to substantial prejudice.
6
   
 
III. 
Appeal of Fumo’s sentence 
 “In sentencing a defendant, district courts follow a 
three-step process: At step one, the court calculates the 
applicable Guidelines range, which includes the application 
of any sentencing enhancements.”  United States v. Wright, 
642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tomko, 562 F.3d at 
567; United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 298 n.5 (3d Cir. 
                                                 
6 Fumo‟s alternative argument that any exposure to potentially 
prejudicial extraneous information constitutes a “structural 
error” in the trial that requires automatic reversal is entirely 
unsupported and unpersuasive.  The cases Fumo cites for this 
proposition concern a court that presented an erroneous 
definition of “beyond a reasonable doubt” to the jury, 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), and a judge who 
both presided over a grand jury hearing and then subsequently 
presided over and found guilty of criminal contempt a witness 
who had testified at the grand jury hearing.  In re Murchison, 
349 U.S. 133 (1955).  While both concerned the right to a fair 
trial, they addressed very different aspects of that right, where 
prejudice is presumed and cannot be rebutted.  
  
Similarly, Fumo‟s argument that the extraneous 
information violated his right to counsel and his right to 
confront witnesses against him also fails, as both challenges, 
like his challenge to the impartiality of the jury, require that 
there be prejudice.  United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 
976 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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2007)).  “At step two, the court considers any motions for 
departure and, if granted, states how the departure affects the 
Guidelines calculation.”  Id. (citing Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567).  
“At step three, the court considers the recommended 
Guidelines range together with the statutory factors listed in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determines the appropriate sentence, 
which may vary upward or downward from the range 
suggested by the Guidelines.”  Id. (citing Tomko, 562 F.3d at 
567). 
 
 “Our review of a criminal sentence . . . proceeds in two 
stages.  First, we review for procedural error at any 
sentencing step, including, for example, failing to make a 
correct computation of the Guidelines range at step one, 
failing to rely on appropriate bases for departure at step two, 
or failing to give meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) 
factors at step three.”  Id. (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  “If there is no procedural error, the second stage of 
our review is for substantive unreasonableness, and we will 
affirm the sentence unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Id. 
(quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568) (internal quotation 
omitted).  Here, the Government does not challenge the 
substantive reasonableness of either Fumo‟s or Arnao‟s 
sentence—it only alleges procedural error. 
 
 “The abuse-of-discretion standard applies to both our 
procedural and substantive reasonableness inquiries.”  Tomko, 
562 F.3d at 567 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007); United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 
2008)).  “For example, an abuse of discretion has occurred if 
a district court based its decision on a clearly erroneous 
factual conclusion or an erroneous legal conclusion.”  Id. at 
567-68 (citing Wise, 515 F.3d at 217).  
 
 Our dissenting colleague argues that the proper 
standard of review for the District Court‟s failure to arrive at 
a final guideline range is plain error because the Government 
did not object to this failure in its sentencing memoranda or at 
 35 
 
the sentencing hearing.  (Dissenting Op. at 2-6).  However, at 
the July 8 sentencing hearing the Government argued the 
merits of and objected to Fumo‟s proposed departures.  It also 
made its position clear that the District Court must first 
“determine whether there are grounds for departure and, if so, 
how many levels up or down . . . thus reaching a final 
guideline range” before “then . . . apply[ing] all of the 
3553(a) factors, one of which, of course, is the guideline 
range that [the Court calculated].”  (J.A. 1558) (emphasis 
added).   
 
In light of these arguments, and the District Court‟s 
failure to advise the parties that it would not separately 
calculate a final guideline range after the completion of step 
two, the Government could not have foreseen that the District 
Court would fail to determine the extent of the departure 
when it pronounced its sentence.  As our colleague notes, “the 
Government could not have objected because the decision it 
claims on appeal to be error had not even been made.” 
(Dissenting Op. at 5).   
 
Under these circumstances, including the lack of an 
opportunity to object to the District Court‟s procedures prior 
to its pronouncement of sentence, we conclude that the 
Government‟s substantive objections to Fumo‟s departure 
requests as well as its recitation, to the Court, of the three-step 
sentencing process preserve its claim for appellate review.  
See United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 230-31 (3d Cir. 
2008) (defendant‟s failure to object “at close of sentencing” 
to the district court‟s neglect of sentencing procedures related 
to the § 3553(a) factors did not require plain error review 
because defendant raised the relevance of those factors in its 
sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing, so 
that he was “not require[d] . . . to re-raise them”). 
 
 Further, even if we agreed with our colleague that the 
plain error standard of review applied, we would nevertheless 
find that the District Court‟s failure to calculate a final 
guidelines range—leaving us unable to review the procedural 
and substantive bases of the sentence—is an error that is 
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plain, that affects the substantial rights of the parties, and that 
could “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Vazquez-
Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 
omitted); id. at 446-47 (finding plain error where the District 
Court “did not accurately follow the second and third steps of 
the procedure set out in [United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 
237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006)],” and thus we could not “know the 
District Court‟s intention in sentencing [the defendant]”).  
 
A. Loss calculation 
 The parties dispute a number of the calculations that 
went into the District Court‟s determination of the loss 
attributable to Fumo‟s fraud.  Ultimately, the District Court‟s 
decisions resulted in a loss calculation for Fumo which fell 
just short of $2.5 million, the threshold for increasing the 
offense level.  “The appropriate standard of review of a 
district court‟s decision regarding the interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, including what constitutes „loss,‟ is 
plenary.  Factual findings, however, are simply reviewed for 
clear error.”  United States v. Napier, 273 F.3d 276, 278 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).   
 
1.  The Pennsylvania State Senate 
a.  Overpayment of Senate employees 
Fumo arranged to have a number of Senate employees 
under his control classified at higher salary grades than they 
were entitled to be based on their duties and qualifications.  In 
order to calculate the losses attributable to this fraud, the 
Government reviewed the human resources manual to 
determine the proper classification for each employee based 
on testimony about the work they actually performed and then 
calculated the loss to the Senate as the difference between the 
highest salary each could possibly have been entitled to and 
the salary each actually received, for a total of approximately 
$1 million.  At the sentencing hearing, Fumo did not dispute 
the type of work the employees actually performed or the 
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salaries that they actually received.  Instead, he argued that 
the calculations were too speculative because the Chief Clerk 
of the Senate could not confirm them and because the Senate 
had failed to fire or reclassify these employees after the fact, 
implying that the original classifications were somehow 
justified.  Agreeing with Fumo, the District Court excluded 
the Government‟s proposed loss altogether. 
 
Of course, the Government bears the burden of 
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount 
of loss.  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 86 (3d Cir. 
2008).   However, although “the burden of persuasion 
remains with the Government, once the Government makes 
out a prima facie case of the loss amount, the burden of 
production shifts to the defendant to provide evidence that the 
Government‟s evidence is incomplete or inaccurate.”  Id.  In 
making a loss calculation, “[t]he court need only make a 
reasonable estimate of the loss.”  United States v. Ali, 508 
F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, 
Application Note 3(C)).  
 
Here, the Government made out a prima facie case of 
the loss amount, and in response Fumo made only the most 
minimal showing of “inaccuracy” in the Government‟s 
calculations.  In fact, Fumo never really challenges the 
substance of the Government‟s calculations, instead relying 
on surrounding circumstances to cast speculative doubt on 
them.  Yet it is not surprising that the Chief Clerk of the 
Senate, who had not reviewed in detail the evidence 
concerning each employee‟s duties, declined to take a 
position on the stand as to the accuracy of the Government‟s 
calculations.  And the Senate‟s decision not to reclassify 
certain of the employees involved could have been prompted 
by any manner of reasoning or purposes.  Although it is 
possible that the Government made errors in the course of its 
calculations, there is no reason to think that its figure was not 
a “reasonable estimate” of the loss, established by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Accordingly, after reviewing 
the District Court‟s grounds for rejecting the Government‟s 
prima facie showing of the loss amount, we are left with “the 
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definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted).  Further, 
because the difference in the loss would place Fumo into a 
higher offense level, the error was not harmless.  
 
b.  Rubin’s “no-work” contract 
The Government next objects to the District Court‟s 
decision to exclude from the loss calculation a $150,000, five-
year contract awarded to Arnao‟s husband Rubin, for which 
he purportedly performed no services.  At the July 8 
sentencing hearing, Fumo informed the court that he had 
gathered additional evidence demonstrating that Rubin had, in 
fact, completed work under the contract.  He submitted the 
evidence on July 13.  The additional material consisted 
largely of credit card bills and calendar entries, documenting 
that Rubin had met with people, but not what those meetings 
had been about.  The Government argued that the evidence 
submitted by Fumo was weak or irrelevant, and noted that 
Fumo‟s current theory that Rubin had worked directly with 
Fumo and met with people on his behalf contradicted Rubin‟s 
testimony at trial, that the contract was with Rubin‟s 
company, B & R Services, for court services.  The District 
Court declined to rule on the issue of loss from Rubin‟s 
contract, stating that “because of the complexity of the Rubin 
loss argument in light of the defense submissions, I felt I 
could not properly resolve it before sentencing.  Rather than 
postpone the sentencing, I declined to rule on it.”  (Sealed 
App. 184-85).  This was an abuse of discretion. 
 
The Federal Rules require a Court to rule on any 
disputed matters at sentencing unless “a ruling is unnecessary 
. . . because the court will not consider the matter in 
sentencing.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).  Fumo argues that, 
because the court excluded the $150,000 from its loss 
calculation, it did not “consider the matter in sentencing,” and 
thus its procedure was acceptable.  Yet, if “not considering 
[a] matter” under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) can mean refusing to 
resolve a matter that is part of the non-discretionary 
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calculation of the Guideline base offense level, then a district 
court could, for instance, exclude any and all losses, simply 
because they are disputed, and, consistent with 32(i)(3)(B), 
calculate a loss amount of $0.  In fact, the District Court here 
effectively did resolve the dispute over the loss from Rubin‟s 
contract in favor of Fumo when it treated the loss as $0.  It 
simply characterized its decision as “declin[ing] to rule on” 
the issue and thus requiring no reasoning on its part.  A 
district court should not refuse to find or calculate a loss 
because of the complexity of the dispute or because spending 
the time to resolve the dispute might delay sentencing. 
 
Fumo cites to United States v. Cannistraro, 871 F.2d 
1210, 1215 (3d Cir. 1989), for the proposition that the court 
may simply refuse to determine whether a loss occurred and 
therefore exclude a proposed loss from the calculation.  
However, in Cannistraro, although there was a dispute over 
the amount of the loss ($400,000 or $3.5 million), the district 
court was not engaged in the non-discretionary process of 
calculating a Guidelines offense level based on the loss.  
Rather, because it was a pre-Guidelines case, id. at 1215 n.4, 
the court was exercising its broad discretion in considering 
the gravity of the offense as a whole and then arriving at an 
overall sentence, Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 
300 (2007) (noting the “pre-Guidelines federal sentencing 
system, under which well-established doctrine barred review 
of the exercise of sentencing discretion . . . .”) (internal 
quotation omitted).  The District Court therefore stated that 
“[i]t‟s not necessary for me to make a decision this morning 
as to whether it was three and a half million or whether it was 
400,000.”  Cannistraro, 871 F.2d at 1215.  In this case, by 
contrast, in order to determine the appropriate offense level 
under the Guidelines, and to comply with the three-step 
sentencing process under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005), and its progeny, it was necessary to definitively 
resolve the issue of the loss amount from Rubin‟s contract. 
 
 Because the Government concedes that this issue must 
be reviewed under the plain error standard, it must show that 
the error was plain, that it affected substantial rights, and, if 
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not rectified, that it would “seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United 
States v. Ward, 626 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
citation omitted).  The failure to resolve the disputed loss here 
meets all three criteria.  Under Booker and our three-step 
jurisprudence, the error is clear.  Further, if the District Court 
had found that Rubin‟s contract was a loss of $150,000, it 
would have raised the offense level of the defendant, 
affecting the public‟s substantial rights.  See United States v. 
Dickerson, 381 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir. 2004) (district court‟s 
impermissibly lenient sentence could constitute “plain error” 
because “Congress‟s interest in imprisoning certain . . . 
offenders is a „right‟ to which the citizenry is entitled”).  
Finally, if courts may simply disregard disputed losses on the 
grounds that they are “not considering” them, the fairness of 
the proceedings may be called seriously into question.  
Accordingly, on remand the District Court should carefully 
consider the evidence and make a determination as to 
whether, and to what extent, Rubin‟s contract resulted in a 
loss to the Senate. 
 
2.  Citizens Alliance 
a.  Tools and equipment 
The Government objects to the District Court‟s 
calculation of the losses resulting from tools and equipment 
purchased by Citizens Alliance but actually used by others, 
including Fumo.
7
  The Government reviewed hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of receipts and credit card statements in 
order to assemble a list of tools and equipment bought under 
the aegis of Citizens Alliance.  It then compared this list 
                                                 
7 Fumo concedes that there were some “minor” arithmetical 
errors in calculating the loss to Citizens Alliance, which 
would pin the loss at $1,077,943, rather than the $958,080 
calculated by the District Court.  He contends, however, that 
these errors were insufficient to affect his offense level. They 
are, however, sufficient to affect Arnao‟s offense level.  See 
Section IV.A., infra. 
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against the inventory of Citizens Alliance and discussed with 
its employees whether it would ever have made any use of 
particular items.  Finally, it assembled two charts identifying 
tools and equipment purchased by Citizens Alliance that it 
believed were used for the benefit of Fumo and his aides, 
though it conceded that the charts were approximate.  Fumo, 
in testifying, reviewed the charts and denied having received 
roughly $50,000 worth of the approximately $130,000 in 
equipment on the charts.  The District Court appears to have 
credited this assertion and reduced the loss by roughly that 
amount.  In light of this credibility determination, we cannot 
say on this record that the District Court‟s factual finding was 
clearly erroneous.  We therefore affirm the District Court‟s 
reduction in the loss amount attributable to the tools and 
equipment.
8
 
 
b.  The Tasker Street property 
The Government sought to assess $574,000 worth of 
losses for rental income and unnecessary improvements to the 
property on Tasker Street, which Fumo induced Citizens 
Alliance to purchase and lavishly furnish, and then used as his 
Senate office with little payment from the Senate for rent or 
maintenance.  The District Court, however, credited against 
that figure the fair market value of the property, which 
ultimately resulted in a significant credit to Fumo.  The 
Government appeals that decision and its reasoning, and 
argues in the alternative that if Fumo is given credit for the 
                                                 
8 
Judge Garth disagrees that the District Court did not err.  He 
would hold that the evidence introduced by the Government, 
and the exhibits that were put in evidence by the Government, 
detailing the cost of tools that were purchased and were used 
by Fumo for personal purposes ($93,409.52) should have 
been added to the loss calculation in full.  The District 
Court‟s ruling in this regard eliminated the findings made by 
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt and significantly the court 
did not issue its own factual findings until after the sentencing 
hearings were over.  In so doing, the Government was not 
able to argue that the Court‟s findings were clearly erroneous. 
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fair market value of the building, the District Court should set 
against it the costs of acquiring, maintaining, and improving 
the building.   
 
 Application Note 3(E)(i) to Section 2B1.1 of the 
Guidelines provides that “[l]oss shall be reduced by . . . [t]he 
money returned, and the fair market value of the property 
returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other 
persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before 
the offense was detected.”  (emphasis added).  The use of the 
word “returned” signifies that for a credit to apply, the 
defendant must have either returned the very same money or 
property, or have provided services that were applied to the 
very same money, value, or property that was lost or taken 
during the fraud.  See also United States v. Radtke, 415 F.3d 
826, 842 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that fringe benefits paid to 
defrauded employees by the defendant were “not . . . the sort 
of credit against loss contemplated by the guidelines” because 
they were “other benefits provided to employee-victims that 
do not correlate directly with the amounts withheld from the 
third-party administrator as part of the fraud.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 
 Here, the Government argues that the money or value 
taken was the maintenance and improvement costs as well as 
the rent that Fumo was not charged by Citizens Alliance as 
owner of the property.  Fumo did not pay or refund any of the 
maintenance, improvements, or lost rent himself, which 
would have been “money returned” under Application Note 
3(E).  Nor did he render services related to these loses, such 
as assisting with the maintenance or improvements himself.  
The Government did not argue that the loss from the fraud 
included the funds spent by Citizens Alliance on purchasing 
the property.  Thus, because neither that property itself nor its 
monetary value were ever alleged to have been taken as part 
of the fraud in the first place, they could not be “returned” to 
Citizens Alliance under Application Note 3(E) and credited 
against the losses.   
 
 To explain the error in the District Court‟s ruling in a 
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less technical way, the maintenance, improvements, and 
rental income the Government identified as losses were 
conceptually independent and collateral to any value received 
because of the purchase of the building.  They would have 
been costs even if Citizens Alliance had owned the building 
beforehand, or even if it had been a lessee rather than owner, 
who subleased the space to Fumo.  Fumo essentially seeks to 
set the value of an independent “good” he purportedly 
secured for Citizens Alliance against the costs his frauds 
inflicted on it.
9 
 He offers no cases in support of this theory of 
loss calculation, which is unsurprising, as it would allow, for 
instance, an officer of a corporation who embezzled from his 
employer to claim credits against the loss caused by the 
embezzlement for overall increases in the company‟s assets 
under his watch.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District 
Court‟s decision to credit the value of the Tasker Street 
property against the losses resulting from Citizen Alliance‟s 
lost rent, improvements, and maintenance costs was an abuse 
of discretion.   
 
c.  The Gazela painting 
Fumo induced Citizens Alliance to commission a 
painting of the Gazela, a historic ship, from a local painter for 
$150,000.  As the Government‟s investigation and media 
reports surfaced, Fumo directed Citizens Alliance to donate 
the painting to the ISM, rather than retain it in his office.  The 
Government argues that this entire amount should count as 
loss, because the painting was otherwise unwanted and it and 
its prints are now in storage.  The District Court credited the 
testimony of an appraiser as to the value of the painting and 
                                                 
9 
Further, even if it were appropriate to grant a credit for the 
fair market value of the building, it would be necessary to set 
off the costs associated with the purchase and maintenance of 
the building.  Obviously, any gain experienced by Citizens 
Alliance due to the value of the building can only be 
calculated after subtracting what it paid to acquire the 
building in the first place.   
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the prints and the Government does not appear to have 
offered a competing formal appraisal.  Accordingly, the 
District Court‟s factual finding is entitled to significant 
deference, and we will not disturb it.
10
 
 
B.  Sentencing enhancements 
 The Government objects to the District Court‟s refusal 
to impose a 2-level enhancement on Fumo for acting on 
behalf of a charitable organization and a 2-level enhancement 
for use of sophisticated means.  “We review a district court‟s 
application of sentencing enhancements for abuse of 
discretion.”  United States v. Robinson, 603 F.3d 230, 233 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
 
1.  Acting on behalf of a charitable organization 
The Government argues that the District Court erred in 
failing to apply a 2-level enhancement for Fumo‟s 
misrepresentation that he was acting on behalf of Citizens 
Alliance, a charitable organization.  The Sentencing 
Guidelines state: “If the offense involved (A) a 
misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a 
charitable, educational, religious, or political organization, or 
a government agency . . . increase by 2 levels.”  U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(8)(A).  The application notes make it clear that this 
guideline applies where an individual purports to be raising 
funds for a charity while intending to divert some or all the 
funds for another purpose. 
 
 Subsection (b)(8)(A) applies in any case 
in which the defendant represented that the 
defendant was acting to obtain a benefit on 
behalf of a charitable educational, religious, or 
political organization, or a government agency 
                                                 
10 
Judge Garth disagrees that the District Court did not err.  
He would hold that the cost of the Gazela painting 
($150,000), and the prints should be included in the loss 
calculation. 
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(regardless of whether the defendant actually 
was associated with the organization or 
government agency) when, in fact, the 
defendant intended to divert all or part of that 
benefit (e.g., for the defendant's personal gain). 
Subsection (b)(8)(A) applies, for example, to 
the following:  
 
 . . . . 
  
 (iii) A defendant, chief of a local fire 
department, who conducted a public fundraiser 
representing that the purpose of the fundraiser 
was to procure sufficient funds for a new fire 
engine when, in fact, the defendant intended to 
divert some of the funds for the defendant's 
personal benefit. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, Application Note 7(B).  The Government 
contends that Fumo‟s behavior fits squarely into this 
guideline because Fumo acquired funds from PECO for 
Citizens Alliance while intending to divert those funds for his 
own use.  Fumo argued and the District Court agreed that the 
Government had not shown Fumo‟s intent to divert the funds 
at the time he obtained them from PECO.  However, the 
Government points out that Fumo acquired a substantial 
portion—$10 million—of the PECO funds in 2002, well after 
he began using Citizens Alliance‟s funds for his own personal 
political benefits.  Indeed, it strains all credulity to believe 
that Fumo repeatedly used Citizens Alliance funds for 
personal and political purposes, then withdrew his intent to do 
so at the time he obtained the $10 million from PECO, then 
regained that intent shortly thereafter as he continued to use 
Citizens Alliance funds for his own benefit.  This evidence of 
Fumo‟s intent to divert the funds was overwhelming, and the 
District Court‟s refusal to apply a 2-level enhancement was 
an abuse of discretion.  
 
2.  Use of sophisticated means 
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The Government next argues that the District Court 
erred in not applying a 2-level enhancement for the use of 
sophisticated means.  The Sentencing Guidelines state: “If . . .  
(C) the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means, 
increase by 2 levels.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C).  As the 
explanatory note 8(B) amplifies, “„[s]ophisticated means‟ 
means especially complex or especially intricate offense 
conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an 
offense. . . . Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or 
both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or 
offshore financial accounts also ordinarily indicates 
sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, Application Note 
8(B) (emphasis added).  “Application of the adjustment is 
proper when the conduct shows a greater level of planning or 
concealment than a typical fraud of its kind.”  United States v. 
Landwer, 640 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation omitted); see also United States v. Frank, 354 F.3d 
910, 928 (8th Cir. 2004) (enhancement appropriate where 
defendants “use[d] other individuals and businesses to 
conduct business on [a defendant‟s] behalf,” as well as a 
“shell entity”); United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (finding “sophisticated means” enhancement 
appropriate where defendant‟s crime “involved the use of a 
shell corporation [and] falsified documents”). 
 
 Here, the District Court rejected the Government‟s 
request for a sophisticated means enhancement for the 
“reasons substantially based upon defense arguments.”  
(Sealed App. 184).  Fumo had argued that the conduct here 
was not “especially complex or intricate, relative to other 
federal criminal fraud cases” under U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(9)(C).  (J.A. 715) (emphasis in original).  Yet Fumo 
induced Citizens Alliance to form for-profit subsidiaries in 
order to permit purchases on his behalf without the 
disclosures required for such entities.  According to the 
evidence, these subsidiaries did no business of their own, and 
at least some of their directors were “recruited” by being 
asked to sign documents the significance of which they did 
not understand.  These subsidiaries leased cars for Fumo and 
paid at least one political consultant for work on a campaign 
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Fumo had a political interest in.  In its memorandum and 
order denying Fumo‟s post-trial motion for acquittal, the 
District Court itself characterized the entities as:  
 
nothing more than sham corporations designed 
to hide the activities of Citizens Alliance that 
were not in conformity with its status as a 
501(c)(3) corporation, such as the purchase of 
the cars for the personal use of Fumo and his 
staff.  In a March 23, 2000 memorandum from 
Arnao to Fumo, Arnao revealed that the two 
were working in close conjunction to create 
these sham corporations, with false corporate 
addresses and purely titular officers.  
 
(J.A. 507).  The use of these sham entities, which were 
created to conceal the flow of funds to Fumo and his 
associates, strongly resembles the conduct described in 
Application Note 8(B) as well as conduct that this Court and 
others have found to fall within the sophisticated means 
guideline.  Here too, we conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in refusing to apply the enhancement.  
 
C. Calculation of the final guidelines range 
 The Government next argues that the District Court 
made a fundamental procedural error in the second step of the 
sentencing process when, after granting Fumo a departure 
based upon his extraordinary public works, it did not 
calculate a new, final guidelines range.  As we have 
repeatedly made clear “[c]ourts must continue to calculate a 
defendant‟s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have 
before Booker[;] [i]n doing so, they must formally rule on the 
motions of both parties and state on the record whether they 
are granting a departure and how that departure affects the 
Guidelines calculation.”  Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247 (emphasis 
added) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also 
United States v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2009).    
 
Fumo initially sought a departure based on his health 
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and his “good works” (i.e., his public service).  The District 
Court ultimately awarded him a significant reduction from the 
guidelines sentencing range of 121 to 151 months that it had 
calculated at step one.  Whether this reduction was ultimately 
a departure under the Guidelines or a variance under § 
3553(a) is itself a contested issue discussed in more detail 
below.  However, at the time the sentence was announced in 
the courtroom, it appeared that it was a departure.  At the July 
14 final sentencing hearing, the Court stated: “I have 
considered what the guidelines have said here and I did make 
a finding as to what the guidelines are, but I‟ve also added a 
finding that I‟m going to depart from them.”  (J.A. 1623).  
Nevertheless, the District Court never actually stated what 
that departure was in terms of the guidelines range; a fact the 
parties noticed.  
 
In his post-sentencing Rule 35(a) motion, seeking to 
have the Court deem its sentence a variance instead of a 
departure, Fumo noted that “[w]hen a sentencing court grants 
a true „departure‟ [as opposed to a variance,] it must state 
how the departure affects the Guidelines calculation.  This 
Court[] fail[ed] to make such a statement . . . .” (J.A. 1629) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).  While 
opposing that motion, the Government noted that the court 
had initially established a “baseline” (i.e., before the 
resolution of the motion for a departure based on good works) 
offense level of 33—although later changed to 32—but 
carefully took no position on whether the court had ever 
announced a final guideline offense level.   
 
In ruling on the Rule 35(a) motion, the Court held: 
“The government correctly states that the court announced it 
was granting a departure.  Thereafter, the court never 
announced the guideline level to which it departed, and, in 
fact, never reached the sentence it did by consulting any 
specific level on the guideline chart.”  (J.A. 1653).  Then, in 
an amendment to the judgment accompanying its ruling, the 
court stated, “I never announced nor have I ever determined 
to what guideline level I had departed.”  (Sealed App. 185-
86).   
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 Fumo attempts to argue that the Court adequately 
completed step two simply by sentencing Fumo to the 
sentence it did—i.e., that reducing Fumo‟s sentence by a 
certain number of months implies what the degree of the 
departure was.  However, the only case that Fumo cites to for 
the proposition that announcing a departure in terms of 
months rather than in terms of offense levels and guidelines 
ranges is United States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 
2001), a pre-Booker case.  Such an approach would make 
little sense under the post-Booker sentencing procedure 
described in Gall.  Offense levels, cross-referenced with the 
criminal history of the defendant, now result in a 
recommended range of months incarceration, and the court 
must then exercise its discretion under § 3553(a) to determine 
where—whether inside or outside of that range—the sentence 
should fall.  If after step one the court simply decides on a 
final sentence without separately completing the second (i.e., 
departures that change the Guidelines range) and third steps 
(i.e., variances that determine the final sentence), it becomes 
impossible for an appellate court to reconstruct its logic and 
reasoning, and therefore to review the sentence.  As we note 
below, this is no idle worry and precisely what occurred here.  
 
As a result, to the extent the District Court‟s 
sentencing reduction was a departure rather than a variance 
under § 3553(a), it erred by failing to calculate a final 
guideline offense level and guidelines sentencing range.     
 
D. Articulation of the basis for the below-guidelines 
sentence related to public service 
 
The Government argues that the District Court further 
erred by failing to clearly articulate whether it was granting 
Fumo a departure or a variance, and that this error requires 
remand.  There are “two types of sentence that diverge from 
the original Guidelines range . . . . A traditional sentencing 
„departure‟ diverges . . . from the originally calculated range 
„for reasons contemplated by the Guidelines themselves.‟  In 
contrast, a „variance‟ diverges . . . from the Guidelines, 
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including any departures, based on an exercise of the court‟s 
discretion under § 3553(a).”  United States v. Floyd, 499 F.3d 
308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).  This 
distinction is more than mere formality.  “Although a 
departure or a variance could, in the end, lead to the same 
outcome . . . it is important for sentencing courts to 
distinguish between the two, as departures are subject to 
different requirements than variances.”  Id.  “[D]istrict courts 
should be careful to articulate whether a sentence is a 
departure or a variance from an advisory Guidelines range.”  
United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
 
When a district court‟s sentencing decision “leaves us 
unable to determine whether the court intended to grant [a] . . 
. departure or a variance,” the court has not, as it must, 
“adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence.”  United States 
v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation omitted).  Under such circumstances, “we will 
remand for resentencing unless we conclude on the record as 
a whole . . . that the error did not affect the district court‟s 
selection of the sentence imposed.”  Id. (internal quotation 
omitted).  Therefore, the Government must establish first, that 
it is impossible to determine with confidence from the record 
whether the District Court granted a departure or a variance 
based on Fumo‟s good works; and second, that the error 
affected the District Court‟s selection of its sentence. 
 
Before the July 8 hearing, Fumo moved for a departure 
based on both good works and ill health.  In its July 9 ruling, 
the District Court denied the request for a departure based on 
ill health, but stated that “a decision on a departure based 
upon good works will be reserved until . . . July 14, 2009.”  
(J.A. 1566).  At the July 14 hearing, the Court initially noted 
that “I did not deny with regards to the good works.”  (J.A. 
1568).  Later on in the hearing, the court announced, “You 
worked hard for the public . . . and I‟m therefore going to 
grant a departure from the guidelines.”  (J.A. 1622).  Finally, 
the court stated, “I did make a finding as to what the 
guidelines are, but I‟ve also added a finding that I‟m going to 
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depart from them.”  (J.A. 1623). 
 
Shortly after the hearing, in response to Fumo‟s Rule 
35(a) motion to “correct” the sentence to establish that the 
sentencing reduction was a variance rather than a departure, 
the District Court issued an order stating that “[t]he 
government correctly states that the court announced it was 
granting a departure.  Thereafter, the court never enunciated 
the guideline level to which it departed, and, in fact, never 
reached the sentence it did by consulting any specific level on 
the guideline chart.”  (J.A. 1653).  The District Court then 
attached an amendment to the judgment, which included the 
following passage: 
 
 I next determined whether there should 
be a departure from the guidelines and 
announced at the sentencing hearing that there 
should be based on my finding extraordinary 
good works by the defendant.  I did not 
announce what specific guideline level the 
offense fell into; that is to say, the precise 
number of levels by which I intended to depart 
because until I considered all other sentencing 
factors, I could not determine in precise months 
the extent that I would vary from the guidelines. 
 
 Having advised counsel of the offense 
level that I found and my intent to depart 
downward, I then proceeded to hear from 
counsel their respective analyses of what an 
appropriate sentence should be.  
 
 The procedure I followed was perhaps 
more akin to that associated with a variance 
than a downward departure because I never 
announced nor have I ever determined to what 
guideline level I had departed. Ultimately, the 
argument over which it was elevates form over 
substance. 
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(Sealed App. 185-86) (emphasis added).  Without the 
amendment to the judgment, we might have been satisfied 
that the Court was departing rather than varying.  However, 
the statement in that document that “[t]he procedure I 
followed was perhaps more akin to that associated with a 
variance than a downward departure” indicates that the 
District Court itself was not certain whether it was departing 
or varying.   
 
This conclusion is reinforced by the District Court‟s 
earlier statement in the same filing that “I did not announce 
what specific guideline level the offense fell into; that is . . . 
the precise number of levels by which I intended to depart 
because until I considered all other sentencing factors, I could 
not determine in precise months the extent that I would vary 
from the guidelines.”  (Sealed App. 186).  This language uses 
“depart” and “vary” interchangeably and admits that the 
Court conflated and combined the second and third steps of 
the sentencing process.  The District Court did not need to 
“consider . . . all other sentencing factors” under § 3553(a) 
before departing to a different guideline level, nor was it 
appropriate to do so.  
 
 We have previously responded to the District Court‟s 
criticism that the distinction between departures and variances 
“elevates form over substance” by noting that “in the 
sentencing context, it is firmly established that form—i.e. 
procedure—and substance are both of high importance.”  
Wright, 642 F.3d at 154.  “We have a responsibility „to ensure 
that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in 
a procedurally fair way.‟”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
Moreover, the difference here may be more than a mere 
formality, given the different scrutiny and standards of review 
we apply to departures as opposed to variances.  In particular, 
our precedent places certain limitations on courts‟ abilities to 
depart based on good works in the case of public officials.  
United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 773 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that “if a public servant performs civic and 
charitable work as part of his daily functions, these should not 
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be considered in his sentencing because we expect such work 
from our public servants” but that “assistance, in time and 
money, to individuals and local organizations” that would not 
ordinarily be part of a defendant‟s work as a public servant 
may properly be considered).  While we need not decide 
whether a departure based on good works could be applied 
here, it is undeniable that a district court has more discretion 
in imposing a variance, where the substance of the sentence is 
only subject to substantive reasonableness review.   
 
 Because of the substantial uncertainty regarding 
whether the District Court‟s reduction was a departure or 
variance, and because that distinction could very well have 
practical effects on Fumo‟s ultimate sentence, we cannot 
conclusively say based on the record as a whole that “the 
error did not affect the district court‟s selection of the 
sentence imposed.”  Brown, 578 F.3d at 226.  Accordingly, 
on remand the District Court should take care to first address 
any departures, and if departures are granted, to then calculate 
a final guidelines range.  Taking this final guidelines range as 
advisory, it should only then consider the sentencing factors 
included in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), decide whether to vary from 
the guidelines, and determine the appropriate sentence. 
 
E. Consideration of the Government’s arguments for an 
upward variance 
 
After learning that the Court proposed to depart 
downwards, the Government moved for an upward variance, 
arguing that the proposed sentence did not adequately 
represent or take into account the full loss from the fraud, the 
damage to public institutions, Fumo‟s perjury at trial, other 
obstructive conduct, and Fumo‟s alleged lack of remorse.  
The District Court did not vary upwards on any of these 
bases.  At the hearing, the Government also raised the 
disparity between the sentence imposed on Fumo and other 
sentences imposed for fraud involving public and charitable 
funds, as well the disparity between Fumo‟s sentence and 
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those imposed on his accomplices in the scheme.
11
 
 
In setting forth how a court should respond to a party‟s 
request for a variance, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he 
sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the 
appellate court that he has considered the parties‟ arguments 
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal 
decisionmaking authority.”  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 
338, 356 (2007).  “[T]he court must acknowledge and 
respond to any properly presented sentencing argument which 
has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.” United States v. 
Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007).  Nevertheless, we 
need not address this argument now, in light of the fact that 
some or many of the Government‟s arguments may become 
moot after the District Court recalculates the guideline range 
and rules on the parties‟ motions for departures.  On remand, 
the District Court should consider any colorable arguments 
for a variance that have a basis in fact, whether made by 
Fumo or the Government. 
 
F. Prejudgment interest on the order of restitution 
 Finally, Fumo also challenges one aspect of his 
sentence, raising two arguments for why prejudgment interest 
on the restitution awarded was an abuse of discretion. 
 
 First, although we previously affirmed an award of 
prejudgment interest on a restitution award in Gov’t of Virgin 
Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 47 (3d Cir. 1994), Fumo argues 
that Davis has been overturned sub silentio by our decision in 
United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 333-35 (3d Cir. 2006) 
                                                 
11 
In particular, John Carter, the former President of the ISM, 
was sentenced to a
 term of 15 years‟ imprisonment.  
Computer technician Leonard Luchko, who was only 
involved with the obstruction of justice portion of the case, 
received a sentence of 30 months‟ imprisonment.  Computer 
technician Mark Eister, who cooperated with the 
Government, received a 5K1.1 departure and was sentenced 
to probation. 
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(en banc).  In Davis, we noted that as a general matter, it is 
“well established that criminal penalties do not bear interest.” 
43 F.3d at 47 (internal citations omitted).  However, we also 
held that the inclusion of prejudgment interest on restitution 
under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), as 
amended by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
(“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(1), was proper because the 
“restitution ordered . . . is compensatory rather than punitive” 
and the “[VWPA] [a]wards are designed to compensate 
victims for their losses, rather than to serve retributive or 
deterrent purposes.”  43 F.3d at 47 (internal citation omitted).  
Given that the restitution ordered here was awarded under the 
VWPA, it would seem that prejudgment interest is 
appropriate under Davis. 
 
 Fumo argues that in Leahy, which determined whether 
United States v. Booker applied to orders of restitution, we 
concluded “that restitution ordered as part of a criminal 
sentence is criminal rather than civil in nature” and expressly 
agreed with three other circuits who we characterized as 
holding “that restitution, when ordered in connection with a 
criminal conviction, is a criminal penalty.”  438 F.3d at 334-
35.  Thus, Fumo argues, because restitution is a “criminal 
penalty,” under Davis‟s own terms prejudgment interest 
should be unavailable.  The underlying tension is that 
restitution, unlike a criminal fine on the one hand, or 
compensatory damages, on the other, serves both punitive 
purposes and compensatory ones.  Indeed, in Leahy we 
framed our analysis by noting “that restitution combines 
features of both criminal and civil penalties, as it is, on the 
one hand, a restoration to the victim by defendant of ill-gotten 
gains, while it is, at the same time, an aspect of a criminal 
sentence.”  438 F.3d at 333.  The question then arises, which 
dictate should courts follow: that a criminal penalty should 
not bear interest, Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 374 
(1947), or that a victim who has suffered actual money 
damages at the hands of a defendant should be fairly 
compensated for the loss, id. at 373, in situations where both 
principles are applicable.   
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In Rodgers, a cotton farmer produced and sold more 
cotton than his quota permitted under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938, and the United States sued to 
recover “money „penalties‟” that the Act made the farmer 
subject to.  Id. at 372.  The District Court awarded interest on 
the approximately $7,000 from the dates the penalties became 
due to the date of judgment.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and 
the Supreme Court reversed.  The Supreme Court first 
affirmed the general rule that “the failure to mention interest 
in statutes which create obligations has not been interpreted 
by this Court as manifesting an unequivocal congressional 
purpose that the obligation shall not bear interest.”  Id. at 373.  
In this particular case, however, the Court analogized the 
penalties to criminal penalties, and noted: 
 
[t]he contention is hardly supportable that the 
Federal Government suffers money damages or 
loss in the common law sense, to be 
compensated for by interest, when one 
convicted of a crime fails promptly to pay a 
money fine assessed against him.  The 
underlying theory of that penalty is that it is a 
punishment or deterrent and not a revenue-
raising device; unlike a tax, it does not rest on 
the basic necessity of the Government to collect 
a carefully estimated sum of money by a 
particular date in order to meet its anticipated 
expenditures.  
 
Id. at 374.  According to Rodgers then, it is the absence of 
“money damages or loss . . . to be compensated for” and the 
lack of authority for “revenue-raising” that makes 
prejudgment interest inapplicable to criminal penalties.   
 
Yet in the context of restitution under the VWPA, 
there are money damages and losses to be compensated.  
Further, as courts have widely agreed, there is authority to 
seek “carefully estimated sum[s] of money”, id., for victims 
under the VWPA, as its “purpose . . . is to ensure that 
wrongdoers, to the degree possible, make their victims 
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whole.”  United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971, 983 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Hughey, 877 F.2d 1256, 
1261 (5th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases), rev’d on other 
grounds, 494 U.S. 411 (1990)).  And in order to make a 
victim whole, prejudgment interest may be necessary to 
“allow an injured party to recoup the time-value of his loss.”  
William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 
1833238, at *5 (3d Cir. May 16, 2011).  Other circuits have 
reached the same conclusion that we reached in Davis, 
finding that prejudgment interest is available on orders of 
restitution under the VWPA and MVRA.  See United States v. 
Qurashi, 634 F.3d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Huff, 609 F.3d 1240, 1247 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 420 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Patty, 992 F.2d 1045, 1049-50 (10th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Simpson, 8 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 626 (9th Cir. 1991); Rochester, 898 F.2d 
at 982-83.  
 
 Moreover, in Leahy, our characterization of restitution 
as a criminal penalty came in the context of whether it was 
the type of award to which the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial applied.  For purposes of our Sixth Amendment 
analysis in Leahy, it was constitutionally irrelevant whether 
restitution under the VWPA also has an important, and 
indeed primary purpose of compensating victims.  While 
Leahy shows that restitution under the VWPA has a punitive 
component that makes it a criminal penalty in the eyes of the 
Sixth Amendment, that does not modify our ruling in Davis 
that such restitution also serves an important compensatory 
purpose under the VWPA, which permits courts to award 
prejudgment interest in order to recoup the time-value of the 
victim‟s loss.  Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Davis 
that prejudgment interest is available for orders of restitution 
under the VWPA and MVRA. 
 
Fumo also argues that the Government, when it 
obtained prejudgment interest on the restitution after the date 
of sentencing, did not give the proper 10 days‟ notice that it 
would need more time to ascertain the amount of loss under 
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18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).  Section 3664(d)(5) reads: 
 
 If the victim‟s losses are not 
ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to 
sentencing, the attorney for the Government or 
the probation officer shall so inform the court, 
and the court shall set a date for the final 
determination of the victim‟s losses, not to 
exceed 90 days after sentencing. 
 
 On its face this language does seem to suggest that the 
Government should provide prejudgment interest calculations 
before sentencing or give 10 days‟ notice that it will need 
more time to make and present such calculations.  However, 
the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 
199 (4th Cir. 2005), noted that other circuits have concluded, 
based on the statute‟s purpose in protecting victims, that the 
90-day “deadline” for determining the victim‟s losses does 
not bar a court from ordering restitution even after 90 days as 
long as there is no substantial prejudice to the defendant.  
This holding has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court.  
Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (2010) (a 
court‟s failure to meet the statute‟s 90-day deadline for 
restitution, “even through its own fault or that of the 
Government, does not deprive the court of the power to order 
restitution”).  Johnson also held, in light of the treatment of 
the 90-day deadline, that the 10-day deadline for the 
Government to provide notice of the need to further ascertain 
the victim‟s loss was similarly no bar to the Court postponing 
or modifying restitution.  400 F.3d at 199.  We agree with 
Johnson and see no reason to distinguish between the 10-day 
deadline at issue here and the 90-day deadline in the same 
provision that the Supreme Court in Dolan held creates a non-
enforceable deadline for district courts.  We will therefore 
affirm the order of restitution, including prejudgment interest. 
 
IV. 
Appeal of Arnao’s sentence 
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A. Loss calculation 
The Government argues that, as it did for Fumo, the 
District Court erred in calculating the loss that Arnao‟s fraud 
caused to Citizens Alliance.  
 
Arnao joins in Fumo‟s arguments with respect to the 
Citizens Alliance fraud, which is the only portion of Fumo‟s 
fraudulent conduct in which she is implicated.  The District 
Court‟s calculations of those losses and our review of them 
affect her sentence as well. Arnao agrees with Fumo‟s 
analysis of the Citizens Alliance loss, which calculated the 
loss at $1,077,943, rather than the $958,080 calculated by the 
District Court.  In addition, as explained above, the District 
Court abused its discretion in crediting the value of the 
Tasker Street property against the losses from maintenance, 
improvements, and foregone rent.  The approximately 
$574,000 loss from that portion of the Citizens Alliance fraud 
is also attributable to Arnao.  Because these revised 
calculations create a loss that is greater than $1,000,000, 
Arnao will receive a 2-level increase in her base offense level 
under § 2B1.1(b)(I).  Accordingly, these errors were not 
harmless as to Arnao and her sentence must be vacated and 
remanded.  
 
B. Procedural reasonableness of the downward variance 
 
Although we vacate and remand Arnao‟s sentence for 
consideration of the proper loss amount from the fraud, we 
also address the Government‟s argument that we should 
vacate Arnao‟s sentence because the District Court failed to 
adequately explain its reasons for granting Arnao a 
substantial downward variance from the advisory guideline 
range.  With regard to whether a court‟s explanation of a 
sentence demonstrates that it meaningfully considered the § 
3553(a) factors, we have stated that “[b]ecause of the fact-
bound nature of each sentencing decision, there is no uniform 
threshold for determining whether a court has supplied 
sufficient explanation for its sentence.”  United States v. 
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 
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omitted).  For some cases, a brief statement will be sufficient, 
while for others a more extensive explanation of the court‟s 
reasoning may be needed.  Id.  However, the greater the 
magnitude of a court‟s variance, the greater the burden on the 
district court to describe its reasoning.  Id. at 216.  
 
Here, despite the Government‟s claims to the contrary, 
the District Court did consider the relevant statutory factors 
and the arguments presented to it at sentencing.  For the most 
part, the Government‟s true concern with the sentence 
appears to be that the District Court did not agree with it on 
the substance.  In its initial brief, for instance, the 
Government argues that the variance was erroneous because 
it relied primarily on Arnao's difficult childhood.  This is a 
substantive criticism, not a procedural one.  Later, in its reply 
brief, the Government admits that the District Court also 
considered Arnao's charitable good works, but contends that 
these good deeds cannot support a large variance.  This, 
again, is a substantive criticism, not a procedural one.  See, 
e.g., id. at 217 (rejecting Government‟s argument, which was 
framed as procedural, that the district court did not adequately 
consider defendant‟s criminal history or the seriousness of the 
offense because it “is a substantive complaint, not a 
procedural one” ).   
 
To the extent its argument is based on alleged 
procedural deficiencies, the Government appears to argue that 
the District Court had a duty to address every single 
permutation of its arguments, counter-arguments and replies.  
But we have never required such pinpoint precision in 
addressing statutory sentencing arguments, and have 
emphasized that review “is necessarily flexible.”  Id. at 215 
(quoting Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 328).  The Government cites 
three examples of sentences that we have overturned on 
grounds of procedural unreasonableness: Id. at 217-20, 
United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2009), 
and Levinson, 543 F.3d at 199-200.  However, each of these 
involved a sentencing court that varied from the Guidelines 
because of a policy disagreement under Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), but without sufficiently 
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explaining the reasoning behind that policy disagreement.   
 
In this case, it is true that there was some hint of the 
District Court‟s disagreement with the way the Guidelines 
treat corruption cases.  Nevertheless, the District Court did 
not suggest that this was an actual basis for its variance.  
Rather, its decision to vary appears to have been based upon 
the considerations of the statutory § 3553(a) factors.  In sum, 
we find that the District Court‟s explanation of the variance is 
sufficiently thorough to demonstrate that it fully considered 
the Government‟s arguments and the various statutory 
factors.  It was also specific and reasoned enough to permit us 
to exercise meaningful appellate review.  Accordingly, we 
find no abuse of discretion in the Court‟s downward 
variance.
12 
   
                                                 
12 
Judge Garth disagrees with this conclusion and would hold 
that the District Court abused its discretion in granting the 
large downward variance it granted to Arnao.  A “major 
variance from the Guidelines requires a more significant 
justification than a minor one.” United States v. Grober, 624 
F.3d 592, 599 (3d Cir. 2010).  In this case, the District Court 
imposed a sentence of only 12 months and one day, based on 
a calculated guideline range of 70-87 months.  Other than its 
conclusory statement that Arnao‟s challenges were “unusual 
from the usual challenge” and its nod to the fact that she “did 
something in [her] lifetime to help other people, to help other 
charities,” the District Court provided little explanation for 
the sizeable downward variance it granted.   
 
 The District Court additionally failed to address, much 
less give meaningful consideration to, several of the 
Government‟s arguments—for example regarding Arnao‟s 
egregious obstruction efforts and the reputational harm to 
Citizens Alliance.  Finally, the District Court provided an 
inadequate explanation in regards to considering unwarranted 
disparities under § 3553(a)(6).  “[A] district court‟s failure to 
analyze § 3553(a)(6) may constitute reversible procedural 
error, even where . . . the court engages in thorough and 
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V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Fumo‟s 
conviction, vacate the sentences of both Fumo and Arnao, and 
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.    
                                                                                                             
thoughtful analysis of several other sentencing factors.”  
Merced, 603 F.3d at 224.   
 
 A sentence may be procedurally improper where it is 
“imposed without considering the risk of creating 
unwarranted disparities and the sentence in fact creates such a 
risk,”  especially where, as here, “the sentence falls outside of 
the Guidelines, or where . . . a party specifically raises a 
concern about disparities with the district court and that 
argument is ignored.”  Id.  The District Court in this case 
largely ignored the Government‟s disparity arguments, and 
instead concluded, without explanation, that the guideline 
sentence would “result in a tremendous disparity.”   
 
 Under these circumstances, Judge Garth would hold 
that the District Court failed to meet its burden of providing a 
sufficient explanation for Arnao‟s variance.  See id., 603 F.3d 
at 216.  Therefore, the variance ordered by the District Court 
was an abuse of discretion.
 
1 
 
United States of America v. Vincent J. Fumo,  
Nos. 09-3388 & 09-3389 
United States of America v. Ruth Arnao, No. 09-3390 
 
NYGAARD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 I agree with the majority and join them in affirming 
Fumo and Arnao‘s convictions.  I do, however, have two 
specific points of disagreement that cause me to dissent.  
First, the majority today vacates the sentencing decision of an 
experienced District Court judge because they claim, inter 
alia, he failed to recalculate the advisory Guidelines range 
after granting Fumo a downward departure.  Without such a 
recalculation, the majority contends that it cannot reconstruct 
the District Court‘s logic and reasoning and, therefore, finds it 
impossible to review the sentence.  Although I question 
whether such a recalculation is even necessary, my reading of 
the record reveals that the District Judge did indeed 
recalculate the advisory Guidelines range after granting the 
downward departure.
1
  Second, I believe the majority 
employs an incorrect standard to review this issue.   
                                              
1
 My dissenting opinion will be confined to my disagreement 
with their finding of procedural error as to the District Court‘s 
departure ruling and Guidelines calculation.  I also dissent 
from those portions of the majority opinion that find the 
District Court‘s classification of loss to be an abuse of 
discretion.  I further disagree with the majority and cannot 
find the District Court‘s refusal to apply sentencing 
enhancements for acting on behalf of a charity (U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(8)(A)) and for the use of sophisticated means 
(U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)) to be an abuse of discretion.  
Because I dissent from the majority‘s resolution of the loss 
2 
 
I. 
A. 
 Quoting our opinion in United States v. Tomko, the 
majority states that ―[t]he abuse-of-discretion standard applies 
to both our procedural and substantive reasonableness 
inquiries.‖  562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  That is a 
correct statement, as far as it goes.  What the majority misses, 
however, is that ―[o]ur standard of review differs based on 
whether the alleged sentencing error was raised below.  If so, 
we review for abuse of discretion; if not, we review for plain 
error.‖  United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 
2009); see also United States v. Vazquez–Lebron, 582 F.3d 
443, 445 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that failure to raise 
procedural error before the district court resulted in plain 
error review); United States v. Watson, 482 F.3d 269, 274 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (―[b]ecause [the defendant] did not object to this 
sentence on this ground during the sentencing hearing, we 
review the District Court's judgment for plain error.‖).  
Indeed, there was no question in Tomko that the appellant 
preserved its challenge to the issue under review: ―[a]t the 
sentencing proceeding, the Government exhaustively 
                                                                                                     
calculation issues, I dissent from that portion of the majority 
opinion that vacates Arnao‘s sentence as well.  I join Judge 
Fuentes, however, in finding no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court‘s loss calculations concerning the tools and 
equipment purchased by Citizen‘s Alliance (Maj. Op. at 39) 
and the painting of the sailing vessel, Gazela (Maj. Op. at 42).  
Finally, I join Judge Fuentes, and find no abuse of discretion 
with the District Court‘s grant of variances to Arnao. 
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asserted, directly in front of the District Court, that a 
probationary sentence would adversely affect general 
deterrence.‖  562 F.3d at 568.     
  
 Even though the majority acknowledges that the 
Government ―carefully took no position on whether the court 
had even announced a final guideline offense level,‖ it 
incorrectly defaults to the ―abuse of discretion‖ standard of 
review.  Maj. Op. at 47.  Review for ―plain error‖ is, instead, 
the appropriate standard of review because, despite ample 
opportunity to do so, the Government did not object to the 
District Court‘s failure to perform a post-departure sentencing 
recalculation.   
 
 Our authority to remedy an improperly preserved error 
is strictly circumscribed.
2
  Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(b), as well as recent Supreme Court precedent, 
sets forth the proper standard of review applicable to 
unpreserved procedural sentencing errors: when a party does 
not preserve an argument in the district court, we review only 
for plain error.  Rule 52(b) provides that, in the absence of 
proper preservation, plain-error review applies.  See 
                                              
2
 As the Supreme Court has noted, there is good reason our 
review is circumscribed: ―anyone familiar with the work of 
courts understands that errors are a constant in the trial 
process, that most do not much matter, and that a reflexive 
inclination by appellate courts to reverse because of 
unpreserved error could be fatal.‖  Puckett v. United States, 
556 U.S. 129, ---, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009) (quoting 
United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 224 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (Boudin, C. J., concurring)). 
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FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(B).  To establish plain error, the appealing 
party must show that an error (1) was made, (2) is plain (i.e., 
clear or obvious), and (3) affects substantial rights.  United 
States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007).  Even if 
an appellant makes this three-part showing, an appellate court 
may exercise its discretion to correct the error only if it 
―seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.‖ Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 
 
 The Supreme Court has specifically held that appellate 
courts can review unpreserved claims for plain error only.  
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731.  The Supreme Court 
has recently again instructed that, ―[i]f an error is not properly 
preserved, appellate-court authority to remedy the error ... is 
strictly circumscribed‖ to plain-error review.  Puckett v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 129, ---, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009).   
Applying plain-error review in the sentencing context ―serves 
worthy purposes,‖ including ―induc[ing] the timely raising of 
claims and objections‖ to give the District Court an 
opportunity to correct error, if error there be.  See Id. at 1428, 
1433.  Indeed, in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court 
instructed that we are to ―apply ordinary prudential doctrines, 
determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below 
and whether it fails the ‗plain-error‘ test‖ when reviewing 
sentences.  543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005). 
 
 The Federal Rules expressly provide that ―[a] party 
may preserve a claim of error by informing the court-when 
the court ruling or order is made or sought-of the action the 
party wishes the court to take, or the party‘s objection to the 
court‘s action and the grounds for that objection.‖ 
FED.R.CRIM.P. 51(b) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, the 
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―objection must be specific enough not only to put the judge 
on notice that there is in fact an objection, but to serve notice 
as to the underlying basis for the objection.‖  United States v. 
Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 1998).  Here, the 
Government‘s sole request at the end of the sentencing 
hearing was for a formal determination on prejudgment 
interest as it affects restitution.  J.A. 1625.  Nor did the 
Government avail itself of the opportunity to challenge the 
District Court‘s sentencing calculations by filing a Rule 35(a) 
motion post-sentencing.  It did file a response to Fumo‘s Rule 
35(a) motion, but failed to raise the issue, despite 
acknowledging that such motions can be used to attack 
technical errors that might otherwise require remand.  J.A. 
1635-36.   See United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 182 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Neither of these actions preserved the 
Government‘s objections nor put the District Court on notice 
that the Government perceived a problem with its sentencing 
calculations post-departure. 
 
 The Government contends that it challenged the 
District Court‘s failure to undertake a post-departure 
recalculation in its sentencing memoranda and at the 
sentencing hearing.  Government‘s Opening Brief at 4.  There 
is no such challenge in the record.  Neither in its own 
sentencing memoranda nor in its response to Fumo‘s Rule 
35(a) motion does the Government object to the failure to 
recalculate post-departure.  The portion of the transcript the 
Government points to in its brief (J.A. 1558) is not an 
objection.  Aside from the Government‘s criticism of our 
opinion in Gunter, infra., this transcript portion is merely a 
discussion with the District Court regarding the application of 
departures or variances generally.  I cannot find an objection 
to the District Court‘s departure or its perceived failure to 
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recalculate a Guidelines range noted there.  And, of course, 
the Government could not have objected because the decision 
it claims on appeal to be error had not even been made.  It is 
obvious to me why the Government did not object: it thought 
then, as I think now, that the District Court did not err.
3
 
 
 I further note that the Government has argued for plain 
error review time after time in situations where a defendant 
fails to object to a procedural error.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 112 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Bradica, No. 09-2420 (Government‘s Brief); United States 
v. Bagdy, No. 08-4680 (Government‘s Brief); United States v. 
Swift, No. 09-1985 (Government‘s Brief).  The government 
knows the rules and cannot have it both ways, arguing for 
plain error review when the defendant fails to object and 
abuse of discretion when it slips up.  Although I would 
                                              
3
 The majority‘s reliance on our decision in United States v. 
Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2008) provides them no cover.  
In Sevilla, we stated that ―‗[a]n objection to the 
reasonableness of the final sentence will be preserved if, 
during sentencing proceedings, the defendant properly raised 
a meritorious factual or legal issue relating to one or more of 
the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).‘‖ Id. at 231 
(quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 n. 11 (3d 
Cir.2007) (en banc)).   But Sevilla is readily distinguishable 
on its facts.  In Sevilla, the defendant-appellant had raised his 
legally recognized grounds for downward variance in a 
written sentencing memorandum prior to the sentencing 
hearing. 541 F.3d at 231.  The Government here never raised 
the issue of the lack of a post-departure recalculation before 
sentencing or afterward.  
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employ plain error review, I will meet my majority colleagues 
where they stand and review this issue for an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
B. 
 The majority faults the District Court‘s application of 
step two of the Gunter analysis.  Specifically, my colleagues 
fault the District Court for failing to announce a final 
Guidelines sentencing range after granting a departure and for 
failing to clearly articulate whether it was granting Fumo a 
departure or a variance.  Maj. Op. at 49.  I disagree with them 
on both points. 
 
 My reading of the record leaves me with no doubt as to 
the District Court‘s decision or its reasoning:  Judge 
Buckwalter granted Fumo a departure under § 5H1.11 for his 
good works.  Fumo specifically moved for a departure on two 
fronts: his ill health and his good works.  The District Court 
specifically denied his request to depart for ill health, but 
granted him a departure for his good works:  ―You worked 
hard for the public . . . and I‘m therefore going to grant a 
departure from the Guidelines.‖  J.A. 1622.  Judge 
Buckwalter reaffirmed this ruling by commenting ―I did make 
a finding as to what the Guidelines are, but I‘ve also added a 
finding that I‘m going to depart from them.‖  J.A. 1623.   
 
 The District Court clarified its ruling even further after 
sentencing.  Fumo filed a motion to clarify his sentence, 
given that Judge Buckwalter ruled on the departure request 
during a discussion of the § 3553(a) factors.  In his motion, 
Fumo specifically asked the District Court whether it had 
intended to grant a variance rather than a departure.   
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Interestingly, in reply, the Government argued that ―the Court 
repeatedly stated that it decided to grant the departure motion 
based on public service.‖  Id. at 1635.  The Government 
argued: 
 
But, it was Fumo himself who 
requested that the Court grant a 
downward departure on the basis 
of his public service.  In his letter 
to the Probation Office stating 
objections to the presentence 
report, dated June 23, 2009, 
Fumo‘s counsel, while noting the 
possibility of both a departure and 
a variance, stated the following in 
a section entitled ―Grounds for 
Departure‖: ―A downward 
departure for Mr. Fumo is 
appropriate because of Mr. 
Fumo‘s health issues and his 
public service, either standing 
alone or in combination.‖  Letter 
at 15.  See also id. at 16 (―Mr. 
Fumo‘s record is not merely 
ordinary, rather it is extraordinary.  
As such, § 5H1.11 it [sic] is a 
valid basis for a downward 
departure.‖).  Next, at a hearing 
on July 8, 2009, regarding the 
guideline calculation, Fumo‘s 
counsel strenuously advanced this 
position.  In response, on July 9, 
2009, the Court issued an order 
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which stated in part, ―As it now 
stands, the offense level is 33.  
The court has already indicated 
that no departure will be granted 
based upon health, but a decision 
on a departure based upon good 
works will be reserved until time 
of sentencing on July 14, 2009.  
Then, at the sentencing hearing on 
July 14, 2009, the Court 
repeatedly stated that it decided to 
grant the departure motion based 
on public service.  As the 
sentencing hearing for Ruth 
Arnao on July 21, 2009, the Court 
reiterated that it had given a 
departure to Fumo while stating 
that it would not similarly depart 
from Arnao‘s guideline range, but 
rather would grant a variance.‖ 
 
J.A. 1635.  Although the Government had no trouble finding 
the District Court‘s intention to grant a downward departure 
crystal clear at sentencing, on appeal it disingenuously 
waffles on the issue and points to a statement that Judge 
Buckwalter added to his official ―Statement of Reasons‖ for 
sentencing: 
 
I next determined whether there 
should be a departure from the 
guidelines and announced at the 
sentencing hearing that there 
should be based on my finding 
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extraordinary good works by the 
defendant.  I did not announce 
what specific guideline level the 
offense fell into; that is to say, the 
precise number of levels by which 
I intended to depart because until 
I considered all other sentencing 
factors, I could not determine in 
precise months the extent that I 
would vary from the guidelines. 
 
Having advised counsel of the 
offense level that I found and my 
intent to depart downward, I then 
proceeded to hear from counsel 
their respective analyses of what 
an appropriate sentence should be. 
 
The procedure I followed was 
perhaps more akin to that 
associated with a variance than a 
downward departure because I 
never announced nor have I ever 
determined to what guideline 
level I had departed.  Ultimately, 
the argument over which it was 
elevated form over substance. 
 
App. at 185-86.  My colleagues seize upon this statement, 
finding the District Court‘s use of the words ―vary‖ and 
―depart‖ confusing.  Indeed, the Majority admits that but for 
this word choice, they would have found Judge Buckwalter‘s 
intentions clear.  Reviewing for abuse of discretion, I find 
11 
 
none.  The record is sufficiently clear for me to bend toward 
the District Court and defer to its reasoning. 
 
 I agree with Fumo here and think this statement clears 
up any possible ambiguity instead of creating one.  Judge 
Buckwalter identifies the standard for granting a departure 
based on good works – extraordinary behavior and/or actions.  
See United States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Furthermore, the judge‘s statement indicates that he granted a 
downward departure for good works, not a variance: ―I next 
determined that there should be a departure from the 
guidelines . . .‖  Indeed, the sentence the majority points to as 
generating all the confusion (―I did not announce what 
specific guideline level the offense fell into; that is to say, the 
precise number of levels by which I intended to depart 
because until I considered all other sentencing factors, I could 
not determine in precise months the extent that I would vary 
from the guidelines.‖) contains a concrete statement that the 
District Court was granting a departure.   I read the use of the 
word ―vary‖ in this particular phrase not hyper-technically or 
as a term of art, but rather in its everyday sense, meaning to 
alter or adjust.  I am neither confused nor unable to ascertain 
whether a departure or a variance was granted here.  It was a 
departure, clearly. 
 
 And, even were I in need of further clarification, I 
need turn no further than to Ruth Arnao‘s sentencing hearing.  
The record there firmly establishes that the District Court 
knew it was granting Fumo a departure.  At Arnao‘s 
sentencing hearing, Judge Buckwalter specifically 
differentiated between the departure he gave Fumo and the 
variance he awarded Arnao: ―So the fact that you, Ms. Arnao, 
at least did something in your lifetime to help other people, to 
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help other charities, it‘s not enough for me to depart from the 
guidelines, but it‘s certainly enough for me to consider to 
vary in some way from what the guidelines suggest here.‖ 
J.A. 1836.  
  
 Let us not split hairs.  Judge Buckwalter granted Fumo 
a § 5H1.11 departure and I see no reason to vacate and 
remand Fumo‘s sentence because the District Court‘s 
intentions were unclear. 
 
 My colleagues also fault Judge Buckwalter for failing 
to conduct a post-departure recalculation of the advisory 
sentencing range.  I have two points of disagreement with 
them here.  First, to my mind, the requirement of a post-
departure recalculation of the advisory sentencing range, 
post-departure, injects a superfluous layer of computation into 
an already unnecessarily hyper-technical process.  Second, 
Judge Buckwalter did recalculate the sentencing range post-
departure. 
 
 In United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 
2006), we established a relatively straightforward procedure 
for District Courts to follow in sentencing a criminal 
defendant post-Booker.  First, district courts are to calculate a 
defendant‘s sentencing Guidelines range precisely as they 
would have pre-Booker.  Id.  Second, district courts were 
instructed to rule on any motions and state on the record 
whether they were granting a departure and, if so, how such a 
departure affects the initial Guidelines calculation.  A district 
court should also take into account our pre-Booker case law, 
which continues to have advisory force.  Id.  Third and 
finally, district courts are required to exercise their discretion 
by considering the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in 
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setting their sentences, regardless of whether it varies from 
the original calculation.  Id.  
 
 Although Gunter requires a district court to calculate 
the Guidelines range, that range is only ―a starting point and 
initial benchmark‖ of the sentencing analysis.  United States 
v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 609 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. at 49 (―As a matter of administration 
and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should 
be the starting point and the initial benchmark.‖).  I see no 
requirement that a district court, after concluding that a 
departure is warranted, recalculate and specify a new adjusted 
sentencing range.  Gunter only requires that a district judge 
indicate how the departure ―affects the Guidelines 
calculation.‖  Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247.   A statement 
indicating whether the departure would go above or below the 
previously determined sentencing range would suffice.   
  
  
The majority finds additional error in what they 
perceive as the District Court‘s failure to recalculate Fumo‘s 
advisory Guidelines range after announcing it would grant the 
former state senator a departure.  I find no such error.  Judge 
Buckwalter did recalculate the advisory range, albeit in terms 
of months rather than levels.  The advisory Guidelines range 
was recalculated to be 121 to 151 months.  He adopted this 
range, thereby satisfying step one of the Gunter analysis.  At 
step two, he ruled on departure motions, announcing a 
downward departure to Fumo for his good works under § 
5H1.11 and denying the Government‘s requested upward 
departure.  Judge Buckwalter then reviewed the § 3553(a) 
factors and decided against any variances, satisfying step 
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three.  He then announced a sentence of fifty-five months, 
revealing a sixty-six month departure.   
 
 The recalculation the majority misses is easily found – 
a departure of sixty-six months from the 121 month bottom of 
the advisory Guidelines range left Fumo with a fifty-five 
month sentence.  It was not procedurally unreasonable for the 
District Court to determine the extent of its departure in terms 
of months instead of levels.  See United States v. Torres, 251 
F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2001).  My colleagues try to brush Torres 
aside as a ―pre-Booker case.‖ Maj. Op. at 48.  This they 
cannot do.  Torres retains vitality, post-Booker, as an 
advisory decision which we require district courts to consult.  
See Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247 (noting that, at Gunter’s first and 
second step, our pre-Booker case law is still to be considered, 
given its advisory force.); United States v. Floyd, 499 F.3d 
308, 312, n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing  Torres for the factors to 
be considered in a §5K1.1 departure post-Booker); see also 
Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d at 445.   
 
 Further, requiring the District Court to recalculate a 
sentencing range based on its sixty-six month departure is 
unfair because the sentencing ranges would overlap.  As 
Fumo pointed out, a sixty-six month departure would have 
put him into levels 23 and 24, leaving the District Court with 
a quandary: which level‘s sentencing range should it refer to 
under § 3553(a)(4)?  Asking the sentencing judge to choose a 
level comes close to requiring him to conceptualize the 
departure in terms of levels, which, of course, he does not 
have to do.  See Torres, 251 F.3d at 151.   
 
 Looking at this another way, I can easily find a 
recalculated sentencing range on this record.  During the 
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sentencing proceedings, the District Court granted Fumo‘s 
motion for a downward departure based on his good works 
and then chose, in the context of considering the required 
statutory factors, a sentence that adequately accounted for this 
finding—fifty-five months.  In sentencing Fumo to fifty-five 
months, Judge Buckwalter implicitly announced a departure 
of eight levels, and then selected a corresponding range (51 to 
63 months) at the § 3553(a) stage.  Id. (―a departure measured 
in months is easily translated into offense levels.‖).  I would 
not require more. 
 
Judge Buckwalter complied with the requirements we 
have articulated for sentencing.  He began by calculating an 
initial Guidelines range, a range which neither party argued 
he arrived at incorrectly.  He then announced, at step two, that 
he would grant Fumo‘s motion for a departure, thereby 
indicating that his ultimate sentence would be below the 
advisory Guidelines range.  At step three, he reviewed the § 
3553(a) factors, determined he would not grant a variance, 
and announced a sentence of fifty-five months.  The District 
Court touched all the procedural bases and consequently, did 
not err. 
 
C. 
 Finally, even were I to agree with the majority and find 
procedural error in the District Court‘s failure to recalculate 
the advisory Guidelines range post-departure, I would still 
dissent from vacating the sentence.  I see no evidence that the 
District Court would have arrived at another sentence had it 
engaged in the additional post-departure calculation now 
required by the majority.  As I stated before, Judge 
Buckwalter presided over this trial for five months and knows 
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more about Fumo than any of us.  He granted Fumo a 
departure based on his good works and, in the context of full 
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, chose a sentence that 
adequately accounted for his findings—fifty-five months 
imprisonment, a fine and restitution.  This sentence would 
have been no different had the District Court announced its 
departure in terms of levels (8) and then selected a sentence 
from the corresponding range (51 to 63 months) at the § 
3553(a) stage.  This is exactly what Judge Buckwalter may do 
on re-sentencing to correct what the majority has perceived to 
be procedural error.
4
   
 
 I recognize that if we find procedural error at any step, 
we will generally ―remand the case for re-sentencing, without 
going any further.‖  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 
214 (3d Cir. 2010).  This approach, however, opens us up to 
serial appeals on procedural error issues before we reach our 
substantive reasonableness review.  United States v. Lychock, 
578 F.3d 214, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding procedural error 
yet proceeding to analyze substantive reasonableness).  See 
also United States v. Stewart, 597 F.3d 514, 525 (2d Cir. 
2010) (Cabranes, J., dissenting sur denial of rehearing).  Here, 
the record clearly demonstrates that the district court 
departed, why it departed, and the extent to which it departed. 
   
II. 
                                              
4
 Indeed, why put the District Court through a complete re-
sentencing?  If the majority finds the record confusing, why 
not, instead of vacating the judgment of sentence, simply 
remand for clarification? 
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 I join my colleagues, however, in affirming Fumo‘s 
and Arnao‘s convictions.   As the majority opinion relates, 
Fumo argues that the District Court abused its discretion in 
not dismissing juror Eric Wuest as a consequence of Wuest‘s 
Internet postings during the trial and jury deliberations.
5
  
Fumo also charges the District Court with abusing its 
discretion by refusing to question the other jurors about their 
exposure to juror Wuest‘s postings.  I agree with my 
colleagues and find no abuse of discretion.  I write separately, 
however, to briefly highlight the challenges that the 
proliferation of social media presents to our system of justice. 
 
 ―The theory of our system,‖ wrote Justice Holmes, ―is 
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced 
only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any 
outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.‖  
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).  Justice 
Holmes, of course, never encountered a juror who ―tweets‖ 
during the trial.  Courts can no longer ignore the impact of 
social media on the judicial system, the cornerstone of which 
is trial by jury.  We have always understood that, although we 
operate from the presumption that a jury‘s verdict will be just 
and fair, jurors themselves can be influenced by a host of 
external influences that can call their impartiality into 
question.  The availability of the Internet and the abiding 
presence of social networking now dwarf the previously held 
concern that a juror may be exposed to a newspaper article or 
                                              
5
 An audio recording of the in-chambers examination of Juror 
Wuest by the District Court and counsel is online and 
available for listening.  See 
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/special/4133127.html and 
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/special/41331457.html. 
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television program.  The days of simply instructing a jury to 
avoid reading the newspaper or watching television are over.  
Courts must be more aggressive in enforcing their 
admonitions. 
 
 The Internet, especially social networking sites like 
Facebook and Twitter, have created a society that is 
―connected‖ at all times.  Facebook, created in 2004, is 
arguably the most popular social networking platform.  
Facebook allows people to communicate with their family, 
friends and co-workers and to share information through the 
digital mapping of people‘s real-world social connections.  
See Facebook, Factsheet, available at 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php (last visited July 18, 
2011).  Currently, Facebook has over 500 million registered 
users, and these users spend over 700 billion minutes per 
month using the site.  Id.  The average user is connected to 80 
community pages, groups or events.  Id.  Twitter was created 
in 2006 and is a real-time information network that lets 
people share and discuss what is happening at a particular 
moment in time.  See Twitter, available at 
http://twitter.com/about (last visited July 18, 2011).  Twitter 
has approximately 100 million users and differs from 
Facebook by allowing its users to send out a text message 
from their phones (up to 140 characters) to their followers in 
real time.  Id.  It is estimated that Twitter users send out over 
50 million of these messages (or, Tweets) per day.  Id.  In 
other words, the effects and affects of electronic media are 
pervasive. 
 
 Jurors are not supposed to discuss the cases they hear 
outside the jury deliberation room.  However, we know that 
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jurors have used Twitter and Facebook to discuss their 
service.  For example: 
 
* In an Arkansas state court, a defendant 
attempted to overturn a $12.6 million verdict 
because a juror used Twitter to send updates 
during the trial.  One post stated ―Oh, and 
nobody buy Stoam.  It‘s bad mojo and they‘ll 
probably cease to exist now that their wallet is 
12m lighter.‖6 
 
* In Maryland, Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon 
sought a mistrial in her embezzlement trial 
because, while the trial was going on, five of 
the jurors became ―Facebook friends‖ and 
chatted on the social networking site, despite 
the Judge‘s instructions not to communicate 
with each other outside of the jury room.  
Dixon‘s attorneys argued that these ―Facebook 
friends‖ became a clique that altered the jury 
dynamic.
7
 
                                              
6
 See Renee Loth, Mistrial by Google, Boston Globe, Nov. 6, 
2009, at A15, available at 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_ 
opinion/oped/articles/2009/11/06/mistrial_by_google/ 
(moving for a mistrial and reversal of a $12 million judgment 
based on a juror's Twitter posting stating: ―oh, and nobody 
buy Stoam. Its [sic] bad mojo and they'll probably cease to 
Exist [sic], now that their wallet is 12m lighter.‖) (last visited 
August 1, 2011). 
7
 Brendan Kearny, Despite Jurors Warning, Dixon Jurors 
Went on Facebook (2009), available at 
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* In the United Kingdom, a case was thrown out 
because a juror sitting on a criminal matter 
wrote on her Facebook page that she was 
uncertain of the defendant‘s guilt or innocence 
and created a poll for her friends to vote.
8
 
 
The examples of this type of behavior are legion.  Not only 
are jurors tweeting, but they have been conducting factual 
research online, looking up legal definitions, investigating 
likely prison sentences for a criminal defendant, visiting 
scenes of crimes via satellite images, blogging about their 
own experiences and sometimes even reaching out to parties 
and witnesses through ―Facebook friend‖ requests.  See David 
P. Goldstein, The Appearance of Impropriety and Jurors on 
Social Networking Sites: Rebooting the Way Courts Deal with 
Juror Misconduct, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589 (2011).   
 
 Of course, jurors doing independent research and/or 
improperly commenting on a case are not new phenomena.  
The Internet and social networking sites, however, have 
simply made it quicker and easier to engage more privately in 
juror misconduct, compromise the secrecy of their 
                                                                                                     
http://mddailyrecord.com/2009/12/02/despite-
judge%E2%80%99s-warning-dixon-jurors-went-on-
facebook/ (last visited August 1, 2011). 
8
 Urmee Khan, Juror Dismissed From a Trial After Using 
Facebook to Help Make a Decision, Telegraph.co.uk, Nov. 
24, 2008, http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/3510926/J
uror-dismissed-from-a-trial-after-using-Facebook-to-help-
make-a-decision.html (last visited August 1, 2011). 
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deliberations, and abase the sanctity of the decision-making 
process.  As we have seen in this case, jurors can use services 
like Facebook and Twitter to broadcast a virtual play-by-play 
of a jury‘s deliberations.    
 
 Technology, of course, will continue to evolve and 
courts must creatively develop ways to deal with these issues.  
In addition to the endorsement the majority opinion gives the 
recently proposed model jury instructions, I would encourage 
district courts to go further.  We must first educate jurors that 
their extra-curial use of social media and, more generally, the 
Internet, damages the trial process and that their postings on 
social media sites could result in a mistrial, inflicting 
additional costs and burdens on the parties specifically, and 
the judicial system generally.  I suggest that district courts 
specifically caution jurors against accessing the Internet to do 
research on any issues, concepts or evidence presented in the 
trial, or to post or seek comments on the case under review. 
 
 Indeed, I can envision a situation where a district judge 
might be called upon to sanction jurors for inappropriate 
Internet research or postings on social networking sites that 
threaten the integrity of the trial.  Such sanctions are not 
unheard of: a juror was recently fined $250.00 and ordered to 
write a five-page essay on the Sixth Amendment by a 
Michigan judge for posting biased comments about the case 
on Facebook.  Jameson Cook, VIDEO: Dismissed Juror 
Ordered to Write Essay About Sixth Amendment, Daily 
Tribune Review, September 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.dailytribune.com/articles/2010/09/02/news/doc4c
806a7b7e451383425678.txt (last visited July 19, 2011).  The 
threat of either fining jurors or holding them in contempt of 
court due to Internet misconduct may become necessary to 
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deter it and convey a public message that the judicial system 
cannot tolerate such behavior.  Finally, the Bar also bears 
some responsibility.  During voir dire, attorneys should 
routinely question jurors on their Internet usage and social 
networking habits.  A juror‘s Internet activities have the 
potential to result in prejudice against a defendant, and 
counsel must expand the voir dire questioning to include 
inquiries into online activity. 
 
 Facebook, Twitter, and other Internet communication 
sites are a boon to the law and the courts.  Improperly used, 
however, they could do real harm.  Problems with jurors‘ 
continued use of these sites and others during their service 
must be anticipated and deterred. 
 
III. 
 In conclusion, I would affirm Fumo‘s and Arnao‘s 
convictions.  I would also affirm the sentences imposed by 
the District Court.   
 
